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Chapter 1 Users’ Susceptibility to Others’ Actions: A Literature Classification 
Framework 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Interpersonal interactions have been the cornerstone of research in a variety of 
disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and management. Naturally, 
any fundamental shift in this regard can have far-reaching research and practical 
implications. In the last decade or so, one such shift has been the emergence of online 
platforms. By building on the advances in the internet technologies, online platforms 
have emerged as the new routes for interactions between different social entities, ranging 
from individuals to governments. For instance, Facebook and MySpace allow individuals 
to form online social networks, share personal information through various forms of 
content, and create groups and communities. LinkedIn and GlassDoor extend the same 
functionalities to professional networks through which individuals can seek employment, 
know more about a potential employer, and review their current and past employers. 
Twitter allows users to share news at a speed that, at times, outperforms the traditional 
news media. 
The considerable variation in the activities, which online platforms facilitate is 
matched by the array of research questions that different literature streams have 
examined. For social psychologists, the central research question is how different stimuli 
ingrained in most human interactions play out in online platforms. As McFarland and 
Ployhart (2015) argue, this research question has a potential to not only theoretically 
distinguish online social platforms from traditional, offline social contexts but also 
formulate an extensive program for future research. Regarding interpersonal exchanges in 
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organizational settings, research questions of interest include how online platforms shape 
the exchanges between internal as well as external stakeholders such as knowledge 
sharing among employees (Wu, 2013), and customer engagement using online platforms 
(Kumar et al., 2016). Next, scholars have also attempted to extend established economic 
mechanisms, including matching markets (Horton, 2014; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 
2010) and network effects (Katona, Zubcsek, and Sarvary, 2011) to online platforms. 
Lastly, by their very nature, online platforms align with the study of social networks. 
Kane et al. (2014) have posited a series of research questions, adopting the social network 
analysis (SNA) lens for studying online platforms. Evidently, online platforms have 
opened newer research avenues across multiple fields. 
 The present dissertation contributes to this body of work. The increasing 
economic activity happening in the digital space is our primary motivation. Perhaps no 
other instance underscores this trend more than the online investment and financial 
platforms (Lee & Shin 2018). The rising prominence of these platforms is also reflected 
in the recent calls for research explicitly targeted towards “Fintech” (Gomber, Kauffman, 
& Weber 2015; Hendershott et al., 2017). Such platforms are particularly interesting 
because they allow users to carry out a personal activity in a highly visible and 
transparent setting. For instance, Venmo broadcasts a user’s personal transactions, 
including bill and rent payments to her network. Kiva and Prosper publicize the amount 
of money that each investor has given to a Crowdfunding campaign (Lin & Viswanathan 
2015). Social trading platforms allow users to broadcast their investment decisions in 
stocks and Forex (Glaser & Risius, 2017). Clearly, one observes that personal investment 
decisions and actions are increasingly taking place in a social domain. Given this 
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transition, it is worthwhile to examine whether and how a focal user’s investments are 
susceptible to other users’ investment actions and decisions (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 
2013). The dissertation addresses this question through a series of related empirical 
studies. 
 In this introductory chapter, our objective is to situate the subsequent empirical 
explorations within a broader research agenda. To that end, we formulate a literature 
classification framework. This framework provides several advantages over other, similar 
efforts. Namely, our classification framework is neither constrained by a particular 
theoretical lens (McFarland & Ployhart, 2015) nor by the types of online platforms to 
which it can be applied (Kane et al., 2014). The framework comprises three categories, 
with each representing a different set of antecedents explaining the focal user’s 
susceptibility to others’ actions. 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: first, we list the commonly 
occurring examples of information signals about others’ actions, which are salient across 
various online platforms. In the same section, we also identify the different mechanisms 
that explain the link between these signals and the observer’s subsequent behavior. Next, 
we develop the classification framework, describing some exemplary studies belonging 
to each of the three categories. Lastly, we map the present dissertation onto the 
framework, identifying the specific areas of contribution. 
2. ESTABLISHING THE BASELINE 
2.1 What information about others’ past actions do the platforms provide? 
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In this section, we provide some instances of the information about others’ actions 
as presented across different online platforms. As we note, the exact information signal is 
highly platform-specific. E-commerce platforms provide online reviews as well as 
aggregated purchase behavior of prior visitors of a product page (Chen, Wang, and Xie, 
2011). On social networking platforms such as Facebook, users can see broadcast 
notifications as well as receive personalized messages conveying activities of their 
friends (Aral & Walker, 2011). On free software distribution platforms, users can see the 
count of prior downloads of each application (Duan, Gu, & Whinston, 2009). Along with 
the instances of online investment and financial platforms discussed earlier, these 
examples indicate that across different online platforms, contextually-relevant 
information about others’ actions is highly salient. 
2.2 What are the corresponding explanatory mechanisms? 
 Table 1.1 lists the different explanatory mechanisms that have appeared in the 
literature over the years. Each of the mechanisms explains the link between the 
information about others’ actions and the focal user’s behavior. However, the 
applicability of a particular mechanism is based on the study’s empirical context. For 
instance, in pro-social contexts, information about other’s prior actions creates social 
norms and signals socially acceptable behavior. Therefore, the observer’s subsequent 
behavior can be explained as a function of conformity to social norms (Shang & Croson, 
2009; Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013). In online retail platforms, opinions of prior 
customers may shape the observer’s perception of the quality of the product, increasing 
the likelihood of future purchases (Rosario et al., 2016). Within the online platform 
literature, each mechanism has spawned a considerable body of work. However, it is 
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important to note that the mechanisms are not conceptually independent in a rigid sense. 
Studies have frequently indicated such overlaps. For example, observational learning is 
rooted in the information cascade theory (Chen, Wang, & Xie, 2011; p. 240), and word of 
mouth is related to social contagion (Aral & Walker, 2011). 
Table 1.1: Overview of the Explanatory Mechanisms 
Explanatory 
Mechanism 
Mechanism Description Examples of empirical 
context  
Information 
cascades 
An individual, after observing 
the prior actions of others, 
follows their choices, 
disregarding her information as 
doing so is optimal in a given 
situation  
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch 1992) 
1. Software distribution 
platforms (Duan, Gu, 
& Whinston, 2009) 
2. Online retailers (Gu, 
Tang, & Whinston, 
2013) 
Conformance to 
norms 
Information about others’ prior 
actions signals “the appropriate 
or desired behavior,” thereby 
guiding the observer’s 
subsequent activity (Shang & 
Croson, 2009) 
1. Crowdfunding 
platforms (Burtch, 
Ghose and Wattal, 
2016) 
Word of mouth 
(WOM) 
It refers to the “dissemination of 
information (e.g., opinions and 
recommendations) through 
communication among people.”  
(Chen, Wang and Xie, 2011; p. 
239) 
1. E-commerce 
platforms 
2. Review platform 
(Rosario et al., 2016) 
Observational 
learning 
Explains the link between the 
“discrete signals expressed by 
the actions of other consumers 
but not the reasons behind their 
action.”  
(Chen, Wang and Xie, 2011; p. 
239) 
1. Music streaming 
platforms (Newberry, 
2016) 
2. Online B2B exchange 
platform (Koh & 
Fichman, 2014) 
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Social 
contagion/Peer 
influence 
Occurs when the “actions of 
one’s peers change the utility 
one expects to receive from 
engaging in a certain behavior, 
increasing the likelihood 
that one will engage in that 
behavior” (Aral, 2011; p. 218) 
1. Social networking 
platforms (Aral and 
Walker, 2011) 
2. Music streaming 
platforms (Bapna & 
Umyarov, 2015) 
3. LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Breaking down the effect of other’s actions 
 Having provided the examples of the information about others’ actions along with 
the underlying mechanisms, we now proceed to develop the literature classification 
framework. It identifies three distinct categories of attributes, which collectively explain 
the susceptibility of user i's (observer) behavior to user j’s (source) actions. First, the 
manner in which source’s prior actions are conveyed to the observer may be pertinent. 
For example, information can be conveyed as generic, broadcast messages as well as 
through personalized directed messages (Aral and Walker, 2011). As we discuss later, the 
information representation may be associated with different underlying mechanisms. 
Second, the characteristics of the information content may explain observer’s 
susceptibility. For instance, information that has positive connotations tends to be less 
influential than the information that has negative connotations (Chen, Wang, & Xie 
2011). Lastly, the attributes of the source, as well as the observer, may play a role. For 
example, an observer may be more susceptible towards the information generated by 
particular sources (Forman, Ghose, & Wiesenfeld, 2008). Figure 1.1 depicts the three 
categories of the classification framework.
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Figure 1.1: The Literature Classification Framework 
 
 
 
1  The behavioral impact of the different types of representation of the information 
2  The behavioral impact of the characteristics of the content of the information 
3  The behavioral impact of the characteristics of the source and observer of the 
information. 
3.2.    Comparison with other Classification Frameworks 
 The proposed framework offers at least three advantages over other, similar 
efforts. First, it applies to a wide variety of online platforms. For instance, Kane et al. 
(2014) limit themselves to “social media” with an emphasis on interpersonal network 
ties. Thus, they exclude other forms of online platforms such as “product review 
networks or peer production communities” (p. 280). However, our classification 
framework presents no such constraints because it does not assume any prior network ties 
between the source and the observer. Second, our framework is not wedded to any 
particular theoretical lens. For instance, McFarland & Ployhart (2015) draw extensively 
from psychology literature to distinguish social media from other forms of digital 
communication and derive research questions for social media research, especially in 
organizational contexts. However, our framework imposes no conceptual lens and hence 
can borrow from several theoretical disciplines. Finally, in contrast to other frameworks 
that emphasize exchanges between a certain kind of social actors (e.g., B2B) (Wang et 
al., 2017), our framework is applicable across different levels of granularity, including 
Observer Source 
3 3 
Representation 
1 
Content 2 
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individuals, communities, and organizations. That being said, our framework remains 
limited in the research issue it addresses: how information about the source’s prior 
actions affect the observer’s subsequent behavior in online platforms. 
3.3. Category 1: Attributes of the Information Representation 
 The first group of studies examines how different representations of the 
information may determine the observer’s susceptibility towards a source. Notable work 
under this category includes the quasi-experimental study of product pages on Amazon 
by Chen, Wang, and Xie (2011). Authors examine two distinct ways in which Amazon 
conveys the information about users’ behavior related to a product. Amazon provides 
consumer-generated reviews for each product as well as the purchase percentages based 
on the prior purchase actions of all users who visited the product page (p. 242). Authors 
argue that the two information signals distinctly affect users’ subsequent purchase 
behavior (p. 247). The rationale for the distinct effects is that the consumer-generated 
reviews lead to word-of-mouth (WOM) communication while the platform-generated, 
aggregate information on prior purchase actions lead to observational learning (OL). In 
closing, authors demonstrate that different representations of information may relate to 
distinct explanatory mechanisms and hence, affect subsequent behavior differently. 
 Aral and Walker (2011) make similar arguments in their large-scale, randomized 
field trial. They compare the social contagion and peer effects resulting from automated 
broadcast notifications with those resulting from personalized referrals. The latter mode 
of information representation is more targeted because the source explicitly selects the 
users who receive such referrals (p. 1624). In automated broadcast notifications, all those 
in the source’s network observe the information. In their study, in which both 
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representations convey the source’s adoption of a Facebook application, Aral & Walker 
(2011) find that broadcast notifications generate significantly stronger social contagion 
and peer effects, resulting in higher adoption by the observer. However, personalized 
referrals are more efficient, in that they lead to higher adoption per message. Thus, 
broadcast notifications, which require less effort from the message sender, generate more 
social influence but are less efficient than the personalized messages, which demand 
considerably more effort from the message sender. Collectively, their study shows that 
the effects of different information representations are distinct. 
 Lastly, Chen and Berger (2016) examine how the modes through which the 
observer acquires information may influence her subsequent sharing behavior. 
Specifically, an observer has a greater propensity to share “discovered” information, 
compared to the information she “receives from others.” The underlying mechanism is 
that when the observer receives any information, she is more likely to evaluate its 
content, which depresses the propensity to share. However, when she discovered 
information, she is less likely to notice the underlying content variations, leading to 
greater sharing behavior.  Consistent with this argument authors find that participants in 
the “Receive” condition, who were told that they had received an article through email, 
were more sensitive to the article’s content than those who “discovered” the same article 
by navigating through other content. Thus, Chen & Berger (2016) show that the manner 
in which information reaches the observer is highly consequential. In sum, the three 
studies demonstrate that the information representation does affect the observer’s 
behavioral response. 
3.4. Category 2: Attributes of The Information Content 
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 The next category refers to studies examining the attributes of the content. 
Typically, these studies use online reviews generated on e-commerce platforms as the 
empirical context (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). The content of such reviews is 
measured in two distinct ways. Scholars measure the “quantitative surrogates” of the 
online reviews such as the volume and the word count (Ludwig et al. 2013; p. 87). 
Building on this work, studies have also explored the linguistic aspects of the review such 
as the level of argumentation in a review (Willemsen et at., 2011), emotions that a review 
conveys (Yin, Bond, & Zhang, 2014), and its affective tone (Ludwig, et al., 2013). 
Lastly, scholars have also examined specific product features discussed in the textual 
component of online reviews (Archak, Ghose, & Ipeirotis, 2011). Clearly, there exists 
considerable literature depicting the susceptibility of an observer’s purchase behavior to 
numeric and linguistic components of information about others’ product usage 
experiences (Floyd et al. 2014, Hong, et al. 2017). 
3.5. Category 3: Attributes of The Source and The Observer 
 Studies categorized under this heading examine how the attributes of the source 
and the observer determine the observer’s susceptibility to others’ actions. One such 
attribute that has found repeated empirical support is the source identity. In their study of 
Amazon product reviews, Forman, Ghose, and Wiesenfeld (2008) showed that product 
reviews written by the sources who disclose their identity in the reviews are considered 
more helpful in making purchase decisions. A similar finding was reported by Liu & Park 
(2015) in their study of Yelp reviews of restaurants. In related work, Aral & Walker 
(2012) showed that the source’s demographic attributes such as age and gender also play 
an important role. Authors find that single, older males are significantly more influential 
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as information sources on Facebook. Similarly, females have a greater influence over 
males than over other females. On the side of the observer as well, similar effects are 
found. For instance, in the same study, Aral & Walker (2012) find that younger users are 
systematically more affected by source’s past actions. However, on the issue of gender, 
Aral & Walker (2012) find that women are less affected by others’ actions. However, 
prior studies have found that others’ actions have a stronger impact on women (Garbarino 
and Strahilevitz, 2004). In all, the demographics of the source and the observer seem to 
play a crucial role. 
 Next, research also shows that the network characteristics of the information 
sources, as well as their prior ties with the observer, are pertinent. For instance, Harvey, 
Stewart, & Ewing (2011) show that tie strength as well as the communication between 
the two significantly increases the propagation information, and therefore, provides 
greater visibility to the source’s YouTube videos. These findings have found widespread 
empirical support. Shi and Whinston (2013) show that the effect of check-in notification 
from the focal user’s friends on the likelihood of the user’s subsequent visit to that 
location is higher than that of notifications from a stranger. Aral & Walker (2014) report 
a similar effect, suggesting that both tie strength and structural embeddedness between 
the source and the observer increase the behavioral impact of source’s past actions.  
 Table 1.2 provides a summary of the framework. The present dissertation 
contributes to the 3rd category of studies. Specifically, we examine the collective effect of 
various social and economic characteristics of the source and observer on their behavior 
in a social trading platform. The rest of the dissertation comprises two empirical studies.  
4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
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4.1       Overview of The Chapters 
 In chapter 2, we model the extent to which an individual investor is susceptible to 
others’ investment actions. Drawing from the streams of self-efficacy and audience 
effect, we find that a focal investor’s prior mastery experiences, as well as the presence of 
an audience, make her less susceptible to others’ actions. However, exogenous changes in 
uncertainty, measured using the “fear indices” (Sarwar, 2012), acts as a significant 
moderator as individuals discount their prior mastery experiences under higher 
uncertainty. However, the audience effect appears robust to the exogenous changes in 
uncertainty. Next, in chapter 3, we adopt a dyadic lens to explain a focal trader’s 
preference for another specific trader. Specifically, in a directed dyad, we model trader i’s 
(an observer) preference for trader j (a source) for making investment decisions. We 
show that an observer’s preference for a particular information source results from a 
complex interplay between economic and social cues about the source. Thus, while 
chapter 2 models a trader’s aggregate susceptibility to others’ investment actions, chapter 
3 provides a more granular understanding by modeling over time variations in an 
observer’s preference towards a specific source. 
4.2 Potential Theoretical Contributions 
 From a theoretical standpoint, the dissertation makes several contributions, most 
of which are enabled by the novel features of the empirical context. First, given the 
availability of longitudinal data on individual-level investment activities, we can pin 
down the explanatory mechanisms that the studies in other contexts mostly overlook. For 
instance, in Chapter 2, we hypothesize that the presence of an audience influences the 
extent to which an individual’s investment behavior is susceptible to others’ past actions. 
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However, in traditional investment contexts, observing and estimating this effect is 
challenging as the audience of an individual investor is not readily known. Second, we 
can unambiguously categorize a portion of a focal individual’s activity as susceptible to 
others’ actions. However, in studies reviewed earlier, researchers cannot similarly dissect 
the behavioral outcomes, limiting their ability to model the extent to which a focal user is 
susceptible to others. Third, we, at least partially, resolve several theoretical tensions 
that have recently emerged, especially in relation to investment behavior. For example, in 
Chapter 3, we show that while the potentially favorable information about a source, such 
as herding (the tendency of an individual to observe and imitate the prior behavior of 
others) and prior payoffs, affects the observer’s preference for that source, these effects 
operate under the constraint of physical distance (Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). 
In sum, the dissertation advances the current state of knowledge about human behavior, 
primarily related to investments.
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Table 1.2: Summary of the Three Categories in the Framework 
Category of studies Central research questions Typical 
Empirical  
Contexts 
Typical measures of 
observer’s subsequent 
behavior 
Instances of 
Studies 
Information 
Presentation 
Do different modes through which 
a platform presents information 
affect its behavioral impact? 
Do different modes through which 
users acquire information affect its 
behavioral impact? 
Facebook 
Amazon 
Controlled 
experiments 
Adoption of a Facebook 
application 
Sales Ranks 
Content sharing 
Aral & Walker 
(2011) 
Chen, & Wang, 
& Xie (2011) 
Chen & Berger 
(2016)  
Information Content Do the characteristics of the 
information content affect the 
behavioral impact of such 
information? 
Amazon 
Barnes & 
Nobles 
Sales rank of a product 
User-reported 
helpfulness of a review 
Chevalier and 
Mayzlin (2006) 
Ludwig, et al. 
(2013)  
Hong, et al. 
(2017) 
Information Source 
and Observer 
Does heterogeneity of information 
sources affect the behavioral 
impact of information such 
sources generate? 
Amazon 
Facebook 
MovieLens 
Yelp 
Sales rank of a product 
Adoption of a Facebook 
application 
Forman et al. 
(2008) 
Aral & Walker 
(2012) 
  
 
 
9 
 
Chapter 2 Doing What Others Do: Understanding Susceptibility to Ambient Social 
Information in Online Platforms 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of online platforms, which incorporate novel features for 
interpersonal exchanges and interactions, has created new opportunities to study human 
behavior (Kane et al., 2014; McFarland & Ployhart, 2015). One of the most significant 
developments in this regard is the platforms’ ability to capture and make public social 
information on the actions and choices of others (Shang & Croson, 2009). For instance, 
on Facebook, social information is presented through notification messages that capture 
and broadcast personal actions of individuals to others in their networks (Aral and 
Walker, 2011). Such notifications often include actions, such as ordering a book on 
Amazon, listening to a song on Spotify, reading a news article on Slate.com or watching 
a movie on Netflix. Typical notifications on Facebook read, “John is watching 
Terminator II” and “John and Jane Doe checked in at CNNGrill at SxSW.” Similarly, e-
commerce platforms, such as Amazon, capture and display product browsing and 
purchase decisions of users to others in the form of aggregated information signals (Chen, 
Wang, & Xie, 2011). Social payment applications, such as Venmo and Blippy, make 
one’s financial transactions, including online purchases, publicly visible after users link 
these applications with their credit cards (Rhue & Sundararajan, 2013). In sum, the 
emergence of online platforms has brought the once personal actions into the public 
domain. 
We use the term ambient social information to refer collectively to social 
information on the actions, choices, and interactions of other users that online platforms 
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capture and make publicly visible. We characterize the social information as being 
ambient to highlight the ever-present and enveloping cache of information that 
continually updates and supplies users with a steady stream of feeds and updates on the 
actions of others. Our characterization of social information as ambient is analogous to 
the ambiance and transparency of communication exchanges on enterprise social 
platforms to the employees of the firm (Leonardi, 2015). 
The influence of ambient social information on the users’ subsequent decisions 
and actions has been well established in both online as well as traditional contexts. For 
instance, the number of prior downloads of software tools by others increases the 
subsequent download activity (Duan, Gu, and Whinston, 2009). Similarly, the 
information about the size of the charitable contributions by prior respondents to a 
fundraising drive increases the subsequent donation amounts (Croson and Shang, 2013) 
and the magnitude of contributions by others in crowdfunding campaigns (Burtch, Ghose, 
Wattal, 2013) influences the behaviors of subsequent platform users. These studies 
highlight that the ambient social information, comprising revealed preferences of others, 
serves as a signal of desirability and quality.  
Studies also show that the manner in which platforms present ambient social 
information also plays a role in determining its influence on the subsequent actions of 
users. For instance, Chen, Wang, & Xie (2011) demonstrate that ambient social 
information, when presented in the form of user-generated product reviews, affects 
subsequent purchase decisions differently than when it is presented as a platform-
generated summary of the prior purchase decisions of other users. Recent studies suggest 
that users’ susceptibility to ambient social information also extends to highly significant 
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and risky decisions such as financial investments. For example, individuals are likely to 
buy or sell the stocks of companies based on the opinions and comments of other users on 
StockTwits and Twitter (Sul, Dennis, & Yuan, 2014). 
Thus, the extant literature establishes that ambient social information consisting 
of other users’ actions and decisions influences subsequent actions and decisions of the 
focal user. In the present study, we contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we 
study theoretically-motivated, user-specific idiosyncrasies that explain the extent to 
which a given user is susceptible to ambient social information. Thus, we address the 
recent calls to examine the underlying theoretical mechanisms that explain the influence 
of ambient social information (Bapna & Umyarov, 2015). Specifically, we find that prior 
mastery experiences of the focal user subsequently weakens her susceptibility to ambient 
social information. This effect is consistent with the prediction of self-efficacy theory 
(Bandura, 1977; 1997). However, we also show that the said effect is contingent on 
uncertainty, as a user significantly discounts her prior mastery experiences under higher 
uncertainty. We also find evidence for the audience effect. A focal user is less susceptible 
to ambient social information as her audience grows. Thus, we provide a nuanced 
understanding of how ambient social information and user behavior are linked in the 
context of online platforms. 
Our study leverages a proprietary dataset obtained from a novel empirical setting 
of social trading platforms. These platforms typically comprise of traders, investing in 
stocks, and currencies. Social trading platforms continuously capture and broadcast the 
trading signals of the active traders. Collectively, these signals constitute the ambient 
social information on social trading platforms. Once a trader joins the platform, they can 
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observe all such trading signals from other active traders, and therefore, can use such 
information to make investments. Most importantly, the platform provides information 
about the proportion of each trader’s total fund that she invests by relying on others’ 
investments actions. Therefore, by observing temporal changes in the proportion over 
time, we can measure the extent to which a trader is susceptible to ambient social 
information, namely, others’ investment actions. The empirical estimation in this study is 
based on a dataset of investment transactions of over 12,000 traders who traded on the 
platform during a 46-week long observation window. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, we review the 
background literature and derive hypotheses. Next, we provide a detailed description of 
the context, the dataset construction process, and the variables. The subsequent section 
describes the results. We also subject our findings to several robustness checks. In the 
penultimate section, we situate our findings in the literature on ambient social 
information and behavior in contexts of online platforms. We conclude the study by 
identifying limitations and directions for future research. 
2. RELATED WORK  
2.1. Ambient social information in prosocial contexts 
 Scholars have been interested in studying the influence of social information on 
subsequent behavior, especially in prosocial contexts, long before the emergence of 
online platforms. A prosocial context refers to a phenomenon in which individuals’ 
actions are intended to be beneficial for others. Typical examples of prosocial contexts 
include charitable giving and contributions towards the public good.  For instance, 
Reingen (1982) found that showing the list of prior individuals who complied with a 
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request, increases the chances of the focal individual’s compliance. Similarly, Frey & 
Meier (2004) show that University students are significantly more likely to make 
prosocial contributions if they are told that a majority of their peers have also contributed. 
Further, suggesting that social information acts as a benchmark for desirable behavior in 
prosocial settings, Croson & Shang (2008) show that when individuals are given 
information about other listeners’ donations to public radio, they adjust their subsequent 
contributions to the levels indicated in such information. Lastly, Croson & Shang (2013) 
find that ambient social information has an implicit boundary condition in that if such 
information is too extreme, and therefore, unreliable, individuals are less affected by it.  
 Coming to the online platform, studies of prosocial behavior report similar results. 
Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal (2013) show that the aggregate contribution an online 
journalism project receives in a crowdfunding platform increases the subsequent 
contributions, indicating that individuals rely on social information about the prior 
lending activity (p. 511). Chen et al.(2010) and Burtch et al. (2017) show that the 
information about the content generated by other users increases the subsequent content 
generation by the focal user. In sum, in traditional as well as online prosocial contexts, 
ambient social information influences subsequent behavior. As the last column in Table 
2.1 indicates, the underlying theoretical mechanisms that explain the influence of ambient 
social information include social comparison (Frey & Meier, 2004), and conformity 
(Croson & Shang, 2008). 
2.2 Ambient social information in non prosocial contexts  
 Ambient social information influences subsequent behavior even in contexts that 
may not qualify as prosocial. The distinction between prosocial and other settings is vital 
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because it is reflected in the underlying theories of behavior. For instance, the ideas of 
social contagion and peer influence operating through the revealed preferences of other 
users have gained considerable momentum in online contexts that are not prosocial. 
Bapna & Umyarov (2015) show that information about the adoption of a paid 
subscription to an online music service by those in an individual’s network increases the 
chances of the subsequent adoption by that individual. Aral & Walker (2011; 2014) find 
that social information about an action the focal user’s peers conveyed through automated 
notifications on Facebook, results in the greater adoption of the Facebook application by 
that user.  
 Other theoretical mechanisms that explain the influence of ambient social 
information on behavior in non-prosocial contexts include word-of-mouth and 
observational learning. These mechanisms have been tested predominantly in e-
commerce settings. In such platforms, the ambient social information consists of user-
generated online reviews as well as platform-generated aggregated signals about prior 
purchases (Archak, Ghose, & Ipeirotis, 2011; Chen, Wang, & Xie, 2011). While the 
baseline effect of ambient social information influencing subsequent behavior is 
persistent (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006), research also shows that the manner in which the 
ambient social information is presented to the users is highly consequential. Chen, Wang, 
& Xie (2011) show that the user-generated reviews, which reflects the word-of-mouth 
mechanism, drive subsequent behavior very differently than platform-generated 
information on aggregate activities of other users, which reflects observational learning.  
 In conclusion, the extant literature establishes that ambient social information 
influences users’ subsequent actions and decisions. In Table 2.1, we categorize the 
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studies based on their treatment of user-level heterogeneity. While a handful of studies 
explicitly model the heterogeneity, the majority of the work abstracts it away, providing 
only a macro-understanding of susceptibility to ambient social information (Table 2.1). 
However, it also presents several avenues for future research not the least of which is the 
lack of examination of user-specific idiosyncrasies which may affect the extent to which 
a user is susceptible to ambient social information. Most studies mentioned so far mask 
the heterogeneity across users, thereby assuming that all users are uniformly susceptible 
to ambient social information. 
 This assumption, however, may not always be valid as indicated by a handful of 
studies that examine user-specific idiosyncrasies. Mostly focusing on product adoption as 
the outcome behavior, these studies show that a person’s susceptibility to ambient social 
information is contingent on their demographic attributes such as age and gender (Aral & 
Walker, 2012; Goel & Goldstein, 2014), users’ network characteristics such as tie 
strength and structural embeddedness (Aral & Walker, 2014), and identity mechanisms 
such as identity congruence and identity esteem (Shang, Reed, & Croson, 2008). Thus, 
the present understanding of the behavioral implications of ambient social information 
can be further enriched by incorporating user-specific idiosyncrasies and heterogeneity. 
This issue is particularly true in contexts that are not prosocial and therefore are less 
driven by the users’ conformity to social norms. In the present study, we address this gap 
by examining two user-specific attributes, rooted in established social psychological 
theories, namely self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; 1997) and audience effect (Bond, 1982). 
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Table 2.1: Classification of Relevant Literature 
 User-level heterogeneity 
modeled 
User-level heterogeneity 
abstracted 
Prosocial 
context 
Shang, Reed, & Croson (2008) 
Reingen (1982) 
Frey & Meier (2004),  
Croson & Shang (2008) 
Chen et al. (2010) 
Shang & Croson (2013) 
Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal (2014) 
Burtch et al. (2017) 
Non-prosocial 
context 
Aral & Walker (2012; 2014) 
Goel & Goldstein (2014) 
Chevalier & Mayzlin (2006) 
Duan, Gu, & Whinston (2009) 
Aral & Walker (2011) 
Chen, Wang, & Xie (2011) 
Bapna & Umyarov (2015) 
3. STUDY CONTEXT 
In this section, we discuss the empirical context of the study to clarify the link 
between the above discussion and the subsequent formulation and testing of hypotheses. 
We use a social trading platform as the empirical context. In general, financial investment 
platforms are increasingly adopting features of online social platforms to improve an 
individual’s decision-making (Wohlgemuth, Berger, & Wenzel, 2016). These “Fintech” 
platforms operate in a myriad of ways, ranging from the provision of benchmarks for 
investment opportunities (e.g., OpenFolio) to allowing users to expose their portfolio to 
other trader's investment decisions (e.g., ZuluTrade). Social trading platforms are of the 
latter type because they allow traders to set up automatic replication of other traders’ 
investment signals (Doering, Neumann, & Paul, 2015). We refer to this platform as 
XTrader (a pseudonym). The platform enables users around the world to invest in leading 
company stocks, foreign currencies, and commodities.  
In order to join the platform, a user is required to have a certain minimum balance 
to start the trading activity. Upon joining, the platform allows users to trade through a 
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variety of instruments. The platform continuously captures and broadcasts the trading 
activities of active traders, generating a digital stream of social information. This 
information is readily observable on each trader’s profile as well as through results of a 
configurable tool for trader-search (see Appendix I). Through either channel, a trader can 
observe the ambient social information, consisting of other traders’ investment signals, 
and choose to rely on it (or not) in making their investments.  
Social trading platforms, including the one we study, offer a novel mechanism 
through which users can leverage the ambient social information, including the other 
traders’ investment signals. This mechanism, termed as copy trading, operates as follows: 
a trader i can observe the trading signals of trader j. Then, i can allocate a portion of her 
fund to j. After the allocation, all the currently open and subsequent investments by j get 
automatically replicated on trader i ’s portfolio. Thus, by observing a trader’s aggregate 
allocation to other traders, one can model the extent to which trader i is susceptible to 
ambient social information. 
4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
4.1. Self-efficacy belief and susceptibility to ambient social information 
Having reviewed the relevant literature and the empirical setting of the study, we 
next formulate a series of hypotheses, predicting a user’s susceptibility to ambient social 
information. In the first hypothesis, we draw on the self-efficacy literature as the 
explanatory theoretical mechanism. Since Bandura’s (1977; 1997) seminal work, self-
efficacy has received considerable research attention. While the concept has been 
described in several ways (e.g., creative self-efficacy by Tierney & Farmer, 2002), its 
definition has remained mostly unchanged. It is defined as the person’s belief that they 
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“possess the competence necessary to be effective and influential in one’s environment” 
(Fast, Burris, & Bartel, 2014; p. 1014). Studies have shown that when an individual 
perceives herself as efficacious, her behavior changes significantly (Liu et al., 2014; 
Hartog & Belschak, 2012).  
We propose that a user’s self-efficacy beliefs determine her susceptibility to 
ambient social information. A person with low self-efficacy belief will “seek out 
relationships with those who advance their goals and avoid those who obstruct their 
goals” (Shea, Davisson, & Fitzsimons, 2013; p. 1032), indicating a potentially 
compensatory behavior. That is, a user may look to compensate for their lack skills and 
expertise by relying on others’ assistance and help. Applying this argument to ambient 
social information, we claim that a user with low self-efficacy will exhibit greater 
compensatory behavior and therefore, higher susceptibility to ambient social information 
than a user with high self-efficacy. 
There are several sources of self-efficacy belief, most effective of which is “the 
mastery experiences or repeated performance accomplishments” (Boyd & Vozikis, 1994; 
p. 67). Such experiences are most effective in enhancing self-efficacy beliefs because 
“they provide the most authentic evidence of whether one can muster whatever it takes to 
succeed” (Bandura, 1997; p. 80). By this argument, favorable outcomes of prior actions 
may act as mastery experiences for an individual, thereby strengthening her self-efficacy 
belief and weakening her susceptibility to ambient social information. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Mastery experiences from prior actions by a user will be negatively 
related to her susceptibility to ambient social information. 
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4.2 Moderating influence of uncertainty  
In the second hypothesis, we examine the moderating role of uncertainty. 
Borrowing from Walker et al. (2003), we consider uncertainty as “the variability inherent 
to the system under consideration” (p. 4), namely in the financial markets involving 
company stocks and currencies. Numerous studies in behavioral decision theory suggest 
that uncertainty significantly alters individuals’ decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Halter & Dean, 1971). Specifically, as uncertainty increases and tasks become 
difficult, individuals experience self-doubt (Oleson et al. 2000) as well as increasingly 
rely on others’ advice (Gino & Moore, 2007). Similar arguments have been made in 
studies of social information in traditional, offline settings. For example, Shang & Croson 
(2009) argue that “individuals are more likely to be positively influenced by social 
information when the situation is (seen as) ambiguous” (p. 1426). In sum, uncertainty 
represents an offsetting mechanism to that predicted in H1. While the mastery 
experiences from prior actions are likely to weaken a user’s susceptibility to ambient 
social information, increase in uncertainty is expected to push a user towards relying 
more on ambient social information. 
Extant literature provides some indication that under uncertainty, sources of self-
efficacy have weaker impacts. For example, in group settings, Gibson (1999) shows that 
under high uncertainty, a “group is not sure how it achieved prior outcomes” (p. 140). As 
a result, uncertainty weakens the effect of the group’s self-efficacy. Bandura (1997) also 
argues that the consequences of self-efficacy sources, specifically the importance of 
mastery experiences, are contingent on the exogenous, environmental conditions. 
Therefore, we argue that under higher uncertainty, a user with mastery experiences, and 
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therefore higher self-efficacy belief, will be more susceptible to ambient social 
information.  
Uncertainty may moderate the effect of prior mastery experiences through another 
route. Specifically, increasing uncertainty may create a “level playing field,” as 
individuals across the skill-levels may become unsure of the paths to achieve a favorable 
outcome (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011). In other words, increase in the 
uncertainty may reduce the overall activity levels across the platform. In our context, this 
effect will translate into a reduction in aggregate allocation because, under higher 
uncertainty, traders may wish to hold back their investment funds. This overarching 
effect may render prior mastery experiences redundant, leading to a substitution effect. In 
either way, we expect that as uncertainty increases, the effect hypothesized in H1 will 
weaken. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Increase in uncertainty will weaken the negative relationship between 
the user’s prior mastery experiences and her susceptibility to ambient social information. 
4.3 Audience effect and susceptibility to ambient social information 
Our third hypothesis postulates the relationship between the presence of an 
audience and the user’s susceptibility to ambient social information (Pfattheicher & 
Keller, 2015). Recent research shows that an audience significantly influences a user’s 
behavior in online settings. Bapna et al. (2016) show that in online dating platforms, the 
veil of anonymity makes individuals more uninhibited as indicated by the diversity (e.g., 
interracial mates, same-sex mates) of the profiles they visit. However, when users cannot 
visit others’ profiles anonymously, their visits become more conventional. Huang, Hong, 
& Burtch (2016) find that the characteristics of a user’s online reviews on Yelp and 
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TripAdvisor become increasingly positive when such reviews attain a larger audience 
through the integration of these platforms with Facebook. Collectively, these effects 
show that user behavior becomes increasingly conforming when the users are under 
observation. 
In online platforms, the presence of an audience indicates a dilemma for the focal 
user. On the one hand, platforms provide an opportunity for the individual to observe and 
benefit from others’ actions through ambient social information. However, because a 
user’s decision to rely on others is itself transparent, it is not without a social cost. The 
underlying reasoning for such costs comes from the extant social psychological literature 
on self-presentation, which argues that in the presence of an audience, individuals want to 
project themselves in a favorable light. There are at least two alternative explanations for 
this effect. Baumeister (1982) states that self-presentation stems from the person’s 
expectation of rewards from a “pleased” audience as well as the urge to present a public 
self that is consistent with one’s ideal self (p. 3). On the other hand, Bond (1982) claims 
that presence of audience creates a fear of embarrassment and loss of face, causing 
people to engage in self-presentation. However, regardless of the reasoning, “the 
performer will be motivated to project an image of competence in the presence of others” 
(Bond & Titus, 1983; p. 267). 
By drawing from these arguments, we claim that given the highly transparent 
nature of online platforms, a user’s susceptibility to ambient social information may be 
viewed unfavorably by her audience (Lee, 2002). As a result, the bigger the audience a 
user has, the more socially costly it will be for her to rely on ambient social information. 
That is, as the audience grows, the self-presentation mechanism will overshadow the 
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benefits of relying on the ambient social information. Thus, our final hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A user’s audience will be negatively related to her susceptibility to 
ambient social information. 
5. DATASET CONSTRUCTION AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
5.1 Dataset construction 
Our original dataset comprises of 15,273 traders observed over 46 consecutive 
weeks. By pairing each trader with each observation week (i.e., balanced panels), we 
obtain 702,558 observations. From this dataset, we exclude approximately 10% 
observations in which the aggregate allocation of the trader towards others exceeded the 
100% threshold because such observations may constitute measurement error. Retaining 
these observations produces no meaningful impact on the sign and the magnitude of the 
eventual estimates. After excluding such records, the observation count reduces to 
683,357. The count of traders remains the same (15,273). However, using the entire 
dataset for estimation may not be valid. Specifically, at any point in time, some traders 
may be dormant for several, unobserved circumstances. To address this concern, we only 
include observation for trader i in week t if at least one transaction was posted to i's 
account in week t. Thus, we consider the presence of transaction on a trader’s account as 
the uniform baseline. After applying this filter, the dataset reduces to 71,358 
observations, consisting of 12,605 traders, which we use for hypotheses testing. In this 
dataset, each panel comprises of a different trader observed over time. 
5.2 Variable descriptions 
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Dependent Variable: The primary objective of the study is to model the extent to 
which individuals are susceptible to ambient social information. Thus, as the outcome 
variable, for each trader i in week t, we calculate the total percentage of the fund she 
allocated to others (SUM_ALLOCATION). For instance, suppose traders i and j have 
respectively allocated x% and y% of their funds to others in week t. If x > y, then we 
claim that trader i is more susceptible to ambient social information than trader j because 
a greater portion of trader j's portfolio is under her control. 
Independent Variables:  Our first independent variable captures a trader’s prior 
mastery experiences which in turn are expected to bolster her self-efficacy beliefs 
(Bandura, 1997). In social trading, prior positive investment gains represent such 
experiences. Thus, for each trader i observed in week t, we calculate the count of weeks 
in which i made profits through independent transactions, starting from the first week in 
which a transaction was reported on i's portfolio till week t 
(PROFITABLE_WEEK_COUNT). For instance, assume that during the 46-week long 
observation window, the first transaction was posted to trader i's portfolio in week ti. 
Thus, the value of PROFITABLE_WEEK_COUNT for trader i in a subsequent week ti + 
k is the count of intermediate weeks in which i made a profit through independent 
transactions. Thus, in any week, this variable captures the aggregate instances of 
favorable, prior mastery experiences that trader i has attained. 
Our second independent variable is related to the audience effect (H3). We 
compute this measure as follows: for each trader i in week t, we count the distinct, other 
traders who have sent messages to i between the first week from the observation window 
on which a transaction was posted to i’s portfolio and week t (MESSAGE_SENDERS). 
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Thus, the computation approach for this variable is consistent with that for the 
PROFITABLE_WEEK_COUNT. We argue that the higher the count of message senders, 
the larger is the audience of the focal trader. To suppress endogeneity between the 
independent variables and the trader’s susceptibility in the present week, we incorporate a 
1-week lag for the former. Also, we log-transform the two independent count variables 
after incrementing their original values by 1. 
Moderating Variable: For measuring uncertainty (H2), we use the Chicago Board 
of Exchange’s Volatility Index (VIXTM). The index predicts the fluctuations in S&P 500 
stocks. While the index is based on large companies listed on American stock markets, it 
is known to have global ramifications (Sarwar, 2012). Over the years, the accuracy of 
VIXTM based forecasts of market volatility has increased (Corrado & Miller, 2005). We 
compute the standard deviation VIXTM values for each observation week (SD_VIX). We 
argue that higher the standard deviations in VIXTM higher the uncertainty. The choice of 
measure is consistent with the existing literature on uncertainty in financial investments 
(Chan-Lau, Liu, & Schmittmann, 2015). 
Control Variables: Trading strategies could be driven by several demographic 
factors such as trader’s nationality (Beugelsdijk & Frijns, 2010) and gender (Sundén & 
Surette, 1998). To account for such unobserved, time-invariant sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity, we incorporate trader fixed effects during the estimation. Next, a focal 
trader’s investments may also be a function of unobserved shocks to the system during 
the observation window. To account for the effect of such shocks on trading behavior, we 
include 45 weekly dummies. Also, we incorporate two time-varying attributes. First, we 
control for the trader’s tenure on the platform. We compute tenure as the count of days 
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between the trader’s platform joining date and the first date of a given observation week. 
We subject this count variable to a log transformation after incrementing it by 1 
(LOG_TENURE). Note that a trader’s joining date may fall outside the 46-week 
observation window. Using tenure as a control variable, we account for any unobserved 
heterogeneity in investments that may result from a given trader’s exposure to the 
platform. Next, we also control for the trader’s gain through copy-trading in each week. 
Specifically, we sum gains that trader i made in a week t (COPIED_GAIN). We reason 
that a trader who has profited by relying on another trader’s investment signals may be 
systematically more susceptible to ambient social information in the present week. For 
the estimation, we lag the COPIED_GAIN control variable by 1 week. Table 2.2 presents 
the pairwise correlations and Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics. We observe that 
the VIF values are proximal to acceptable thresholds (Rai et al., 2015). Also, all the 
pairwise correlation coefficients are below 0.5. Therefore, we conclude that the variables 
do not suffer from any major concern pertaining to collinearity. 
Table 2.2: Pairwise Correlations and Collinearity Diagnostics 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
Sum of Allocation 
(V1) 1      
Log of Tenure (V2) -0.0301* 1     
Total Gain from 
Copying (V3) 0.0545* -0.0049 1    
Log of Profitable 
Week Count (V4) -0.1315* 0.1111* -0.0019 1   
Log of Message 
Senders (V5) -0.0756* 0.1504* 0.0097* 0.3979* 1  
Std. Dev of VIX (V6) -0.2727* 0.0464* -0.0463* 0.0321* -0.0184* 1 
   * p < 0.05  
  Highest VIF Score = 1.21 
  Mean VIF Score = 1.11 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Sum of 
Allocation 
Log of 
Tenure 
Total 
Gain   
from 
Copying 
Log of 
Profitable 
Week 
Count 
Log of 
Message 
Senders 
Std. Dev. 
of VIX 
Average 71.08209 6.133425 0.126421 0.254136 0.325687 0.630272 
Minimum 0 0 -89.1643 0 0 0.08204 
Maximum 100 7.724005 33.21812 2.772589 8.540323 2.44788 
Std.Deviation 43.69851 0.595932 2.154948 0.484943 0.820481 0.538581 
 
6. ANALYSIS 
6.1 Hypothesis testing 
We begin hypothesis testing with the sum of allocation by a trader in a week as 
the outcome measure. To account for any unobserved heterogeneity across the traders, we 
incorporate trader fixed effects. Moreover, in each model, we include a vector of fixed 
effect dummies for the observation weeks. We incrementally estimate the coefficients of 
interest, starting with a baseline model (Model 1) which computes the estimates for the 
time-varying two control variables: log of trader’s tenure and the average gains per 
copied transaction (Table 2.4). As expected, we find that an increase in the gains through 
copying increases total allocation in the subsequent weeks. Next, in Model 2 and Model 
3, we respectively incorporate the measures for testing H1 (count of profitable weeks) 
and H3 (count of distinct senders of messages). In Model 4, we simultaneously estimate 
the two main effects. Next, for testing H2, we incorporate the interactions between 
uncertainty and the count of profitable weeks (Model 5). Subsequently, we introduce the 
interaction between uncertainty and the audience effect (Model 6). Although we have not 
hypothesized this interaction effect, it is worthwhile assessing whether the “watching 
eyes” phenomenon is contingent on the uncertainty.  Lastly, we test all the hypothesized 
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effects simultaneously in Model 7. In this fully specified model, we find that the three 
hypothesized effects are jointly significant. 
Coming to the effect sizes, we find (Model 4) that a 1% increase in the Trader’s 
mastery experiences reduces the total allocation in the subsequent week by 2.57 (H1). A 
similar increase in the count of message senders reduces the subsequent allocation by a 
factor of 1.46 (H3). Next, we find that the interaction between the uncertainty and prior 
mastery experiences operates expectedly. To further clarify the nature of the interaction 
term hypothesized in H2, we plot the marginal effect of the count of profitable weeks for 
varying levels of uncertainty (Figure 2.1). The figure shows that under conditions of high 
uncertainty (red line), prior mastery experiences have a marginally negative effect on 
total allocation. However, under conditions of low uncertainty (blue line), the negative 
effect of prior mastery experiences on total allocation is stronger. This finding is 
consistent with H2. 
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Figure 2.1: Interaction between Mastery Experiences and Uncertainty 
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Table 2.4: OLS with Trader and Time Fixed Effects  
(DV = Sum of Allocation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Trader Experience (Log) 4.148+ 4.027+ 4.113+ 4.028+ 3.987+ 4.048+ 4.005+ 
 (2.358) (2.348) (2.348) (2.342) (2.339) (2.339) (2.338) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.161** 0.147** 0.149** 0.141** 0.144** 0.144** 0.145** 
 (0.0516) (0.0515) (0.0517) (0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0517) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)  -3.392***  -2.570** -4.339*** -2.608** -4.097*** 
  (0.923)  (0.932) (1.011) (0.933) (1.018) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)   -1.781*** -1.462** -1.407** -2.162*** -1.811** 
   (0.499) (0.508) (0.507) (0.555) (0.563) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VIX     2.318***  1.972*** 
     (0.382)  (0.408) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VIX      1.173*** 0.663* 
      (0.285) (0.302) 
Constant 64.37*** 65.40*** 64.59*** 65.33*** 65.70*** 65.24*** 65.59*** 
 (13.98) (13.92) (13.92) (13.88) (13.87) (13.87) (13.86) 
N 58753 58753 58753 58753 58753 58753 58753 
Adj. R2 0.7248 0.7250 0.7251 0.7252 0.7255 0.7253 0.7255 
AIC 517731.0 517683.7 517671.4 517647.0 517588.6 517617.8 517582.0 
BIC 518144.1 518105.8 518093.5 518078.1 518028.7 518057.9 518031.0 
Trader Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
  Robust standard errors clustered on traders are reported 
   + p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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6.2 Robustness Check-I: Are the results robust to the choice of measures for the 
variables of interest? 
 The results obtained so far indicate empirical support for the hypothesized effects. 
Moreover, the results are robust to the outcome measure as well as the estimation 
approach. In this section, we subject our findings to additional robustness checks. We 
begin by assessing whether the results are robust to the choice of the uncertainty 
measures (Table 2.5). We replace the standard deviation of VIX with the standard 
deviation of VXO, which is an alternate index by Chicago Board of Exchange. Much like 
VIX, VXO is also conceived as a fear index, but while VIX is calculated using the S&P 
500 Index, VXO is calculated using S&P 100 Index (Guo & Wohar, 2006). In addition, 
we also use the standard deviation of VXST, which represents a short-term uncertainty in 
the financial markets. We find that after changing the measure of uncertainty, the key 
effects are retained (Model 8-9). Therefore, we conclude that the results are robust to the 
choice of the measures.
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Table 2.5: Re-estimation using Alternate Measures  
(DV = Sum of Allocation) 
 Model 8 Model 9 
Trader Experience (Log) 4.019+ 4.000+ 
 (2.339) (2.338) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.145** 0.145** 
 (0.0517) (0.0518) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log) -3.995*** -3.879*** 
 (1.010) (1.001) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -1.686** -1.767** 
 (0.558) (0.557) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VXST 1.119***  
 (0.229)  
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VXST 0.281+  
 (0.170)  
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VXO  1.798*** 
  (0.384) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VXO  0.620* 
  (0.292) 
Constant 65.47*** 65.59*** 
 (13.86) (13.86) 
N 58753 58753 
Adj. R2 0.7255 0.7255 
AIC 517592.2 517586.3 
BIC 518041.3 518035.4 
Trader Fixed Effects Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effect Y Y 
  Robust standard errors clustered on Traders are reported 
   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
6.3 Robustness Check-II: Are the results in the present week driven by the high 
performing traders from the prior week? 
 A possible concern is that traders who were the highest gain in week t-1 may have 
no better-performing traders to allocate funds in week t. As a result, the observed 
reduction in SUM_ALLOCATION may be driven by the presence of such high-
performing traders. To test this possibility, we first sort all traders in a week based on 
their total, independent gain. Consider trader i who achieved gain Gi in week t-1. If no 
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other trader produced gain greater than Gi in t-1 then, after sorting, trader i appears in the 
first position in week t-1. Next, we exclude top 10, 25 and 50 traders from each week. 
Thus, we can reasonably argue that the remaining traders in each week had an option of 
copying the investment signals of a better-performing trader. Consequently, the outcome 
variable values for the retained traders can be construed as a deliberate choice. After 
removing the high performing traders from each week, we find consistent results (Model 
10-12). Hence, we conclude that the results are not contingent on high-performing traders 
from prior weeks (Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6: Excluding High Performing Traders from Prior Weeks  
(DV = Sum of Allocation) 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Trader Experience (Log) 4.536+ 4.891+ 5.087* 
 (2.446) (2.531) (2.536) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.171*** 0.164** 0.156** 
 (0.0509) (0.0516) (0.0518) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log) -5.715*** -5.454*** -5.248*** 
 (1.032) (1.065) (1.080) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -2.071*** -1.916** -2.018** 
 (0.582) (0.608) (0.622) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VIX 2.551*** 1.970*** 1.796** 
 (0.437) (0.531) (0.550) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VIX 0.734* 0.494 0.512 
 (0.366) (0.412) (0.429) 
Constant 62.40*** 60.06*** 58.86*** 
 (14.47) (14.96) (14.99) 
N 51791 47668 46884 
Adj. R2 0.7598 0.7422 0.7468 
AIC 451140.5 415522.1 407813.7 
BIC 451459.2 415785.2 408032.6 
Trader Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
  Robust standard errors clustered on Traders are reported 
   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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6.4 Robustness Check-III: Are the results contingent on the structure of the 
dataset 
 Next, we test whether the statistically significant results are consistent across 
different, randomly generated subsamples of the original dataset (Table 8). Estimating 
effects with random subsamples assesses whether the significance detected is mostly a 
function of the sample size (Yao et al., 2009). More specifically, a typical concern about 
large-sample, observational studies is the possible detection of small differences in 
means, which may not be practically meaningful (Lin, Lucas, & Shmueli, 2013). To 
address this concern, we randomly prune our dataset by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. 
We rerun the OLS estimator with trader and observation week fixed effects. In Models 
13-17, we find that across the five subsamples results remain consistent (Table 2.7). 
Thus, we conclude that the support for the hypothesized effects is not contingent on the 
configuration of the original dataset. 
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Table 2.7: Re-estimation using Randomly Generated Subsamples 
(DV = Sum of Allocation) 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Trader Experience (Log) 3.848 4.899* 4.572+ 1.956 5.129+ 
 (2.418) (2.493) (2.617) (2.732) (3.016) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.115* 0.120+ 0.159* 0.115+ 0.107 
 (0.0542) (0.0612) (0.0625) (0.0642) (0.0680) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log) -3.902*** -4.629*** -4.107*** -2.537* -3.420** 
 (1.025) (1.138) (1.186) (1.236) (1.325) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -1.764** -2.117*** -2.794*** -2.008** -1.402* 
 (0.579) (0.616) (0.662) (0.697) (0.683) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VIX 1.795*** 2.003*** 1.638*** 1.879*** 1.753** 
 (0.427) (0.470) (0.473) (0.535) (0.546) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VIX 0.824** 0.800* 1.006** 0.972* 0.200 
 (0.317) (0.352) (0.379) (0.383) (0.392) 
Constant 66.20*** 60.16*** 62.26*** 77.45*** 57.84** 
 (14.34) (14.78) (15.51) (16.19) (17.89) 
N 52940 47012 41044 35313 29328 
Adj. R2 0.7293 0.7308 0.7331 0.7392 0.7439 
AIC 464687.5 411459.6 357562.8 305698.4 251837.3 
BIC 465131.4 411897.5 357993.9 306122.0 252251.6 
Trader Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
           Robust standard errors clustered on Traders are reported 
                   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.5. Robustness Check IV: Fractional Response Model 
 Next, we estimate whether the results change if we replace the OLS estimator 
with one designed specifically for fractional response outcomes (Papke & Wooldridge, 
2008). These estimators are useful as they enforce the [0,1] bounds on the post-estimation 
predictions. Although using a fractional response model for unbalanced panels is a topic 
of future research for econometricians  (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008), results obtained 
with fractional estimator without Trader-level fixed effects may still indicate the 
robustness of the findings to alternate specifications. Accordingly, we use the fractional 
response estimator with dummies for observation week 
(https://www.stata.com/manuals/rfracreg.pdf) (Model 18-20). In Model 18, we compute 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, in Model 19, we compute Bootstrap standard 
errors with 100 repetitions, and in Model 20, we cluster the standard errors on Traders. 
We consistently obtain similar estimates for the three hypothesized effects, suggesting 
that the findings are stable to the choice of the estimator (Table 2.8).  
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Table 2.8: Fractional Response Model  
(DV = Sum of Allocation/100) 
 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Trader Experience (Log) -0.0723** -0.0723** -0.0723* 
 (0.0240) (0.0225) (0.0345) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.0310*** 0.0310*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00482) (0.00470) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log) -0.970*** -0.970*** -0.970*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0426) (0.0528) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -0.224*** -0.224*** -0.224*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0294) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VIX 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0473) (0.0490) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VIX -0.00885 -0.00885 -0.00885 
 (0.0317) (0.0328) (0.0293) 
Constant 2.222*** 2.222*** 2.222*** 
 (0.148) (0.141) (0.209) 
N 58753 58753 58753 
AIC 38620.8 38620.8 38620.8 
BIC 39078.8 39078.8 39078.8 
Trader Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
               Model 18: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors 
               Model 19: Bootstrap standard errors with 100 repetitions 
               Model 20: Standard errors clustered on Traders  
                     + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.6 Robustness Check V: Panels with varying outcome 
 Finally, we test whether the results are driven by the panels in which the outcome 
variable does not vary throughout the observation window. Accordingly, we compute the 
standard deviation of SUM_ALLOCATION in each panel. We exclude panels in which 
the standard deviation is zero. In the dataset, we find 5,013 such panels (N = 13,640). 
After excluding these observations, we obtain consistent support for the hypothesized 
effects (Model 21, Table 2.9). Thus, we conclude that the findings are robust to the 
panels in which the outcome does not vary over the observation window. 
Table 2.9: Excluding Panels in which Outcome Variable does not Vary 
(DV = Sum of Allocation) 
 Model 21 
Trader Experience (Log) 4.859+ 
 (2.596) 
Sum of Copied Gain  0.136* 
 (0.0552) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log) -4.663*** 
 (1.154) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -1.944** 
 (0.656) 
Count of Profitable Weeks (Log)×SD_VIX 1.073** 
 (0.414) 
Count of Message Senders (Log)×SD_VIX 0.309 
 (0.326) 
Constant 62.96*** 
 (15.48) 
N 50216 
Adj. R2 0.7362 
AIC 448283.1 
BIC 448724.3 
Trader Fixed Effects Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y 
  Robust standard errors clustered on Traders are reported 
   + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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7. CONCLUSION 
We began the study by observing that while the extant literature establishes the 
link between ambient social information and subsequent behavior in online platforms, it 
leaves several questions unanswered, namely the lack of examination of user-specific 
characteristics and heterogeneity. This issue is even more pertinent when the context is 
not prosocial, and hence, does not enforce conformity to social norms. Our study 
addresses this gap by hypothesizing and demonstrating effects that are consistent with 
social psychological theories. Thus, our study opens the black box of ambient social 
information and behavior, thereby expanding on the known theoretical mechanisms 
available to scholars of user behavior in online platforms. Future studies can build on our 
work by examining other, theoretically-motivated attributes that vary across users and 
therefore, are likely to affect users’ susceptibility to ambient social information. 
Our study also provides a comparative account of different categories of 
theoretical mechanisms. Self-efficacy and the audience effect have developed as distinct 
research streams in psychology literature. While self-efficacy is based on an individual’s 
belief in their competence (Bandura, 1977, 1997) and is inherently personal, self-
presentation operates only in the presence of other individuals (Bond, 1982) and therefore 
is decidedly social. Consequently, self-efficacy and audience effects can be viewed as 
instances of two distinct classes of antecedents of human behavior: personal and social. 
Thus, in the context of online platforms, our study compares the effect of the two kinds of 
mechanisms on individual behavior. 
We also contribute to the self-efficacy literature. The variety of outcomes that 
self-efficacy influences range from making creative contributions (Richter et al., 2012) to 
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acting as a whistleblower (MacNab & Worthley, 2007). In the information systems (IS) 
literature, the notion of self-efficacy has been predominantly used in assessing 
technology usage (Thatcher & Perrewé, 2002). In online contexts, studies have shown 
that self-efficacy positively influences contributions to a public knowledge repository 
(Ray, Kim, & Morris, 2014). We advance this literature by exploring the link between 
sources of self-efficacy beliefs and a user’s susceptibility to ambient social information. 
From a methodological standpoint, our study is consistent with recent calls to conduct 
within-person studies to gain a better understanding of how self-efficacy operates (Yeo & 
Neal, 2013). We use the count of prior profitable weeks based on self-trades as the 
measure for prior mastery experiences, which we suggest enhance self-efficacy beliefs.  It 
may be that these self-trades by the individual were based on observations of other 
traders rather than based on their own judgment.  If this is the case, the true level of self-
efficacy is potentially lower than what our measure suggests. Yet, the data suggests that 
count of prior profitable weeks provides theoretically consistent results, lending credence 
to our approach of using this signal as an indirect measure for assessing this social-
psychological construct. 
Our study is an important step forward towards understanding audience effect. 
Given that the online platforms increase the transparency of user behavior, the audience 
effect is especially pertinent in online platforms. While it is known that in the presence of 
audience, a focal user follows an expected pattern of behavior such as visiting online 
dating profiles (Bapna et al., 2016) and contributing online reviews (Huang, Hong, & 
Burtch, 2016), we show that the audience effect also influences a user’s susceptibility to 
ambient social information and nudges her into making autonomous decisions. More 
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generally, we find evidence that being watched makes a user less susceptible to others’ 
actions and decisions. Future work can examine the generalizability of this finding to 
other online platforms.     
Lastly, our study contributes to the understanding of human behavior in the 
nascent phenomenon of social trading. In the last decade, technologies have begun 
transforming even the most fundamental aspects of financial and investment markets 
(Morris, 2016). While there have been some attempts at understanding how individuals 
make investment decisions on these platforms (Wohlgemuth, Berger, & Wenzel, 2016), 
there is no systematic inquiry about the underlying social psychological mechanisms that 
explain trader behavior. Our study addresses this gap by obtaining theoretically consistent 
results. 
Predicting a trader’s susceptibility to ambient social information has considerable 
practical implications for the platform’s business. Typically, a social trading platform 
relies heavily on the presence of traders who make profitable trades and therefore, can 
attract new users as well as generate money for the platform (Doering, Neumann, & Paul, 
2015). Thus, most social trading platforms, including XTrader, seek to retain such 
traders. Currently, however, most social trading platforms have static, pre-determined 
incentive schemes that reward traders as and when they clear different performance 
thresholds. However, as we have shown, under higher uncertainty, even the traders who 
have made profitable self-trades, become more susceptible to others’ trading signals as 
well as reducing self-trades. Given this insight, social trading platforms can devise 
incentive schemes that may provide an additional reward to the profitable traders for the 
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self-trades made under higher uncertainty, thereby motivating such traders not to discount 
their expertise. 
Our study is not without limitations. Most importantly, in order to establish the 
validity of the measures and the hypothesized mechanisms, we rely on the platform’s 
novel feature of unambiguously attributing each transaction either to the focal trader’s 
autonomous decision or her susceptibility to others’ trading signals. However, we have 
no direct measures of user-specific attributes of self-efficacy and audience effect as in 
most other studies? (Thatcher & Perrewé, 2002). Consequently, while our study finds 
theoretically consistent results, we cannot make more definitive claims. For instance, 
self-efficacy can be classified into general and specific efficacy (Agarwal, Sambamurthy, 
& Stair, 2000) and these more granular types may have a different influence on 
dependency behavior. Future work can measure the specific aspects self-efficacy in 
online contexts to develop and test more granular hypotheses. 
In conclusion, our study shows that although online platforms generate ongoing 
information about actions and revealed preferences of the users, social psychological 
mechanisms play a crucial role in determining the influence of such information on users’ 
subsequent behavior. We find that under certain conditions, users become less susceptible 
to ambient social information even in online platforms that provide such information in 
abundance. Thus, we show that the role of ambient social information in shaping 
behavior is more complicated than previously believed. 
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Chapter 3 Whom Do They Prefer for Making Money? Determinants of Information 
Source Preference in Online Platforms 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent years, the emergence of online platforms has created newer ways for 
information flows. For example, on Facebook, over 2 billion individuals generate 
information about their daily activities, which is accessible to their network of friends and 
even beyond (https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/). On 
YouTube, individuals collectively view nearly 1 billion hours of videos per day 
(https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/28/people-now-watch-1-billion-hours-of-youtube-per-
day/), observing information about diverse topics, including the video uploaders’ daily 
activities, product reviews, and opinions about current affairs. In sum, online platforms 
have led to a considerable increase in the quantity of information produced, as well as the 
ease with which it can be accessed. We consider such information to be social because it 
conveys users’ prior actions and choices (Shang & Croson, 2009) as well as ambient 
because it is enveloping and ever-present (Leonardi, 2015).  
As the existing research reveals, ambient social information is highly 
consequential in shaping the audience’s subsequent behavior (Bapna & Umyarov, 2015; 
Aral & Walker, 2011). However, users’ capacity to consume such information remains 
limited. Therefore, a focal user may be selective in that she may prefer some information 
sources more than the others. In this regard, our fundamental research question is as 
follows: with several users generating ambient social information and acting as 
information sources in online platforms, whom does the focal user prefer? This question 
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is even more pertinent when the preference for a particular information source has 
considerable financial implications. 
To address this question, we begin with an observation that the preference for a 
specific information source is the function of different attributes of the source. The focal 
user can observe these attributes and then formulate her preference. However, different 
attributes affect the focal user’s preference in distinct ways. On the one hand, certain 
attributes about the information source may have a positive effect on preference. For 
instance, studies of herding signal show that the focal user may prefer those who have 
already attracted a large audience (Liu et al., 2015). Similarly, the literature also suggests 
that the prior payoffs that the focal user has received from an information source also 
increase that user’s preference for that source (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). However, these 
studies fail to incorporate the counteracting effect of physical distance between the 
information source and focal user. The literature indicates that physical distance impedes 
online interpersonal exchanges, including those of a financial nature (Agarwal, Catalini, 
& Goldfarb, 2015). Building on this work, we examine how the combined effect of 
physical distance, herding signal, and prior payoffs drive the focal user’s preference for 
an information source. 
Our empirical context is an online social trading platform. Such platforms are a 
part of recent technological innovations that are changing the way financial markets 
operate (Doering, Neumann, & Paul, 2015). In the coming years, social trading and other 
financial technologies, which are often referred to as Fintech, are expected to gain 
importance as millennials account for an increasingly large section of the active investor 
population (Morris, 2016). For several reasons, it is appropriate to use a social trading 
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platform as an empirical context for studying the research question at hand. First, the 
platform continuously records and displays investment transactions of each user. Thus, at 
any time, multiple information sources are present. Second, social trading platforms 
incorporate a novel feature through which one can unambiguously observe variations in 
users’ preferences. This is made possible because a focal user’s preference for an 
information source is indicated by the exchange of funds from the former to the latter. 
Third, the platform has a global user-base. In our dataset, we observe users from 95 
distinct countries. Thus, the physical distance between the user and the information 
source may vary greatly, affecting the former’s preference for the latter. Finally, because 
preferring one information source over the other has direct implications for the focal 
user’s investment portfolio. Hence, for the focal user, being selective in preference for 
different information sources is a meaningful outcome.   
 Our study formulates and tests a set of related hypotheses, each proposing a link 
between an attribute of an information source and the focal user’s preference for that 
source. Our estimation is based on a dataset comprised of forty thousand user-source 
dyads between actively trading users, observed for 46 consecutive weeks. Our results 
indicate that while the herding signal and prior payoffs increase the focal user’s 
preference for an information source, the physical distance between the two moderates 
these effects. In particular, the herding signal of a distant information source has a 
significantly stronger effect than that of a proximate information source, suggesting that 
while the herding signal as a decision heuristic may positively affect the focal user’s 
preference, its effect is more meaningful in the presence of physical distance (Agarwal, 
Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). 
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 We also find that the focal user significantly discounts the prior payoffs obtained 
from a physically distant information source compared to those obtained from a 
physically proximate information source, indicating that the unfamiliarity which physical 
distance breeds may supplant the effect of the focal user’s prior payoffs from an 
information source (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). This finding strongly points to a 
behavioral explanation of the physical distance (Lin & Viswanathan, 2015). Collectively, 
our study provides key insights into how, in the presence of multiple information sources, 
the attributes of a specific information source are factored into the focal user’s preference 
for that source. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: in the next section, we review the 
relevant literature and describe the study’s empirical context. Next, we develop a set of 
related hypotheses. In the next section, we provide variable description and the dataset 
construction process, followed by results of hypothesis testing. We complete the analysis 
by demonstrating the robustness of our findings. In the final section, we discuss the 
contributions of the study and identify directions for future research. 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 Attributes of information sources that explain focal user’s preference 
 A considerable body of work suggests that users’ behavior in online platforms can 
be explained by the ambient social information generated by the multitude of platform 
users, who act as information sources (Aral & Walker, 2012, Chen, Wang, & Xie, 2011). 
However, a more granular argument suggests that all information sources do not matter 
equally (Kim & Ratchford, 2012). Constrained by her ability to consume the available 
information, a focal user prefers some information sources over others. Studies have 
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attributed the uneven preference to the attributes of the information source. Such 
attributes range from simple demographic features to more nuanced psychological 
characteristics such as identity.  
 Aral & Walker (2012) showed that on Facebook, product adoption notification 
from older, single males generate greater influence over other users than the notifications 
generated by users from other demographic clusters. While in their randomized field 
experiment, authors do not model the focal user’s preference as a deliberate choice, the 
demography-based variations are indicative that all information sources are not 
considered equal in online settings. Other studies examine the presence of prior 
friendship ties between the focal user and information sources as another determinant of 
uneven preference. Shi & Whinston (2013) show that the check-in information provided 
by the focal user’s friends has a strong influence on the likelihood of that user’s 
subsequent visit to that location because friends’ ambient social information acts as a 
strong signal of “congruence in preferences.” Similarly, Liu et al.(2015) show that when 
contributing to a crowdfunding project, the focal user is more likely to follow the 
investment actions of her friends. Lastly, the focal user may prefer an information source 
whose identity is known. Forman, Ghose, & Wiesenfeld (2008) show that a focal user 
perceives those online product reviews, in which the reviewer’s identity is revealed, as 
more helpful than those in which the reviewer identity remains hidden. In sum, a 
considerable body of existing work identifies several attributes of an information source, 
which may increase the focal user’s preference for that source. 
 On the other hand, some attributes may lower the focal user’s preference for an 
information source. Recent literature on physical distance effects in online platforms, 
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especially in Crowdfunding platforms, shows that individuals prefer to donate or invest 
money in physically proximal campaigns. There exist several explanations for the 
distance effect in online platforms. For instance, Lin & Viswanathan (2015) find 
behavioral factors drive the lead individuals to invest in proximal campaigns even when 
such campaigns provide lower economic returns (Lin & Viswanathan, 2015). Burtch, 
Ghose, & Wattal (2014) indicate that higher physical distance operates as a proxy for 
greater unfamiliarity and therefore, inhibits interpersonal interactions and exchanges. In 
closing, physical distance acts as an inhibitor for interpersonal exchanges in online 
platforms and therefore may counterbalance the effects of the other attributes of an 
information source. 
2.2 The combined effect of different attributes of the information source 
 Based on the prior work, we argue that the complete understanding of which 
information source users prefer cannot be obtained unless one simultaneously examines 
these counteracting effects. So far, the literature remains unclear on how physical 
distance combines with other attributes of the information source. For example, in an e-
commerce setting, Forman et al. (2008) show that the physical distance between the 
information source and the users weakens the effect of additional, identity-revealing 
information about the source. On the contrary, in online crowdfunding settings, Agarwal, 
Catalini, & Goldfarb (2015) show that the physical distance between the entrepreneur and 
the investor may enhance the effect of the entrepreneur’s herding signal. Lastly, a similar 
study by Greenwood & Gopal (2017) in the context of offline IT investments finds no 
consistent empirical support for the interaction between the IT entrepreneur’s herding 
signal and their physical distance from the VC.  
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 Together, these studies underscore that present literature is highly inconclusive in 
ascertaining how the focal user’s physical distance from an information source is factored 
into the evaluation of the source’s other attributes. The present study addresses this 
research gap. In particular, we model the focal user’s preference for an information 
source as a function of herding signal, prior payoffs and physical distance from that 
source.  
2.3 User behavior in online platforms for financial markets 
 The present study also relates to the growing interest in examining human 
behavior in emerging online platforms for financial markets. Collectively referred to as 
Fintech, these platforms have become increasingly popular in research as well as practice. 
For instance, Crowdfunding researchers have examined the antecedents and 
consequences of prosocial donations and contributions to public good (Burtch, Ghose, & 
Wattal, 2013; Liu et al., 2015), investments in real estate ventures, and funding given to 
different forms of creative arts such as music and films (Gamble, Brennen, & McAdam, 
2017; Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). Another prominent technological advance 
under Fintech refers to cryptocurrencies. For example, recent studies of Bitcoin user 
networks find predictable patterns such as preferential attachment (Kondor et al., 2014) 
and trust (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017). Lastly, researchers have also examined behavior in 
social trading platforms. Prominent research efforts in this stream include prediction of 
financial returns through trades (Berger, Wenzel, & Wohlgemuth, 2017) and the 
disposition effect, which refers to realizing investment returns by immediately closing a 
profitable investment while retaining a losing investment for a longer time (Glaser & 
Risius, 2017). The present study is motivated by such attempts to explain behavior in 
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information-rich, Fintech settings. More specifically, we model the focal user’s 
preference for investment signals generated by other traders in a social trading platform 
(Wohlgemuth, Berger, & Wenzel, 2016). 
3. STUDY CONTEXT 
In this section, we describe the empirical context of the study to clarify the link 
between the discussion in the previous section and the subsequent development of 
hypotheses. The study is based on an online social trading platform, which we refer to as 
XTrader (a pseudonym). A typical user on this platform is a trader who is interested in 
investing money in several instruments such as company stocks, precious metals, and 
currencies. Social trading platforms apply features from a typical social media platform 
to online trading (Doering, Neumann, & Paul, 2015). For instance, social trading 
platforms allow traders to communicate with each other, share updates about their trading 
activities, and form ties. 
The study leverages a salient feature common across many social trading 
platforms. It is referred to as copy-trading (Figure 3.1). Essentially, it is a mechanism that 
creates directed trader- dyads. The feature works as follows: a trader i joins the platform 
by depositing a certain fund amount (fi), which she wants to invest. This funding amount 
can be deposited with the trader’s profile using a variety of means such as Bank account, 
and credit cards. Once on the platform, i can observe ambient social information, 
comprised of other traders’ investment signals (Appendix II). Based on this information, 
trader i can choose another trader j and allocate a portion of fi to trader j. Upon allocation, 
the platform automatically replicates all of trader j’s subsequent and currently open 
investments to trader i's portfolio. 
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Thus, through the allocation of funds, trader i’ indicates her preference for trader j 
as an information source. Moreover, because trader i has limited funds, she has to choose 
j from a number of other traders deliberately. Therefore, non-zero allocation in a trader 
dyad {i  j} indicates that trader i explicitly picked trader j from a sizeable pool of other 
traders, making trader i's preference for a trader j, a deliberate action. In the rest of the 
study, the allocating trader i is referred to as Learner while trader j is referred to as the 
Guru.  
Figure 3.1: Copy-Trading Mechanism in Social Trading Platforms 
 
4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Herding signal of an information source 
 The study’s first main effect pertains to the herding signal. Herding has been 
widely studied in offline (Sun, 2013) as well as online settings, including in settings 
involving financial and investment decisions (Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015). It is 
said to occur when a decision maker imitates the prior, collective behavior of others. The 
existing literature identifies several explanations for herding behavior, such as social 
proof (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001), information cascades (Duan, Gu, & Whinston, 2009), 
and observational learning (Shi & Whinston, 2013). However, across all these 
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explanations, the basic herding mechanisms remain the same. By observing the prior 
behavior of others, individuals follow the herd (Greenwood & Gopal, 2017).  Extending 
the same argument, we postulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis-1:  A herding signal of an information source will increase the focal user’s 
preference for that source. 
4.2 Prior payoffs from an information source 
 In the second hypothesis, we postulate the link between the focal user’s prior 
payoffs from an information source and her subsequent preference for that source. The 
literature suggests that individuals “tend to repeat actions that have produced favorable 
outcomes in the past” (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008; p. 2683) as positive payoffs from her 
prior actions are likely to result in choice reinforcement. This hypothesis has found 
considerable empirical and theoretical support, including in investment decisions 
(Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). In the same vein, we argue that if the focal user obtains 
positive, prior payoffs from a particular information source, the user is likely to exhibit a 
higher preference for that source in the subsequent time. Thus, our second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
Hypothesis-2:  Prior payoffs generated by the focal user from an information source will 
increase the focal user’s preference for that source. 
4.3 The physical distance between the focal user and the information source 
Having hypothesized the effects of attributes that increase the focal user’s 
preference for an information source, we proceed to examine the counteracting effect of 
physical distance between the focal user and an information source. With the emergence 
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of the internet, it was opined that “distance is dead” (Cairncross, 2001) as well as “the 
world has become flat” (Friedman, 2005) because individuals face no additional costs for 
interacting with those who are physically distant. However, several studies have shown 
that physical distance still matters. In this regard, several mechanisms have been 
presented, explaining the role of physical distance in online settings. These include home-
bias, which is particularly applicable for goods that can be consumed only in a specific 
location (Hortacsu, Martinez-Jerez, & Douglas, 2009), absence of prior social ties with 
physically distant users (Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015), and distance as a proxy 
for unfamiliarity and lack of awareness (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2014). However, 
irrespective of the mechanism, the result remains consistent.  The greater the physical 
distance between two users, the less likely are they to interact and participate in an 
exchange. Extrapolating the same logic, we formulate the third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3:  A focal user will have a lower preference for a physically distant 
information source than for a physically proximal information source 
4.4 The interaction between herding signal and physical distance 
 Having postulated the three main effects, we move on to suggesting ways in 
which the physical distance effect may interact with those of herding signal and prior 
payoffs. The herding signal and physical distance, as topics, are covered in distinct 
streams of literature. Therefore, little is known about the potential interaction between the 
two attributes. While some recent studies have begun exploring this issue, especially in 
financial investment contexts, the evidence remains contradictory. In their study of 
venture capitalist (VC) investments in IT companies, Greenwood & Gopal (2017) 
hypothesize that the herding signal will have a stronger effect on VC’s investment 
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likelihood as the physical distance between the entrepreneur and the VC increases. 
However, they find no consistent empirical support for this claim (p. 1002). On the other 
hand, Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb  (2015) find that in online crowdfunding, an 
investor is significantly more influenced by the herding signal of a distant entrepreneur 
than that of a physically proximal entrepreneur. 
 In the present study, we hypothesize that the herding signal of a physically distant 
information source will have a stronger effect than that of a physically proximal source. 
Our argument borrows from the literature on the role of physical distance in financial 
investment decisions (Huberman, 2001). As suggested in H3, users may perceive a 
physically proximal source as more familiar than a physically distant one. We argue that 
such preexisting sense of familiarity will override the source’s herding signal as a 
decision heuristic, thereby reducing its influence on the focal user’s preference for an 
information source. Conversely, the herding signal may be significantly more important 
when the focal user and the information source are physically distant because the distance 
implies greater unfamiliarity (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2014). Thus, our penultimate 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Physical distance between the focal user and the information source will 
increase the effect of the source’s herding signal on the focal user’s preference for that 
source. 
4.5 The interaction between prior payoffs and physical distance 
 Lastly, we hypothesize an interaction effect between the focal user’s prior payoffs 
obtained from an information source and the physical distance. The effect may operate in 
either way. On the one hand, physical distance, and the unfamiliarity it espouses may 
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weaken the positive effect of prior payoffs. As a result, the focal user may not perceive 
the payoffs obtained from a physically distant information source to be evidence of 
benefits of preferring that source over the rest. In other words, physical distance may act 
as a boundary condition for the extent to which past outcomes drive future actions 
(Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008).  
 On the other hand, prior payoffs, especially those obtained in monetary terms, 
may overcome the unfamiliarity barrier associated with physical distance. In such a 
scenario, the payoffs may demonstrate the viability of preferring an information source, 
to the extent that the focal user may at least partially disregard the unfamiliarity concerns 
related to physical distance. Because the extant literature provides no clear answer to the 
directionality of the interaction effect between physical distance and prior payoffs, we 
postulate our final hypothesis in two parts. 
Hypothesis 5a: The greater the physical distance between the focal user and the 
information source, the weaker will be the positive effect of prior payoffs on the focal 
user’s preference for that information source. 
Hypothesis 5b: The greater the physical distance between the focal user and the 
information source, the stronger will be the positive effect of prior payoffs on the focal 
user’s preference for that information source. 
5. DATASET AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
5.1 Dataset construction 
 Our initial dataset was comprised of 57,324 distinct trader dyads that existed at 
least once during the observation window of 46 weeks. To construct the final dataset, we 
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first combine every dyad {i  j} with every week t. Thus, we construct 57,324 balanced 
panels for 46 weeks, obtaining a total of 2,636,904 observations. From this dyad, we 
exclude all observations in which a Learner’s collective allocation crossed the 100 
percent threshold. Such observations may result from potential measurement errors. 
Thus, our observation set reduces to 2,423,451. The number of dyads remains constant at 
57,324. Next, we consider the possibility that observing every dyad in every week may 
not be valid as there may exist unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity across trader 
dyads, which may influence the value of the outcome variable. To overcome any such 
concern, we enforce the following baseline constraint. We only include a dyad {i  j} in 
week t if at least one trade was posted to the accounts of trader i and trader j, which 
suggests that both the traders in a dyad were not only present on the platform but also 
were actively investing. This constraint reasonably assures that the values of the outcome 
variable indeed stem from deliberate decisions of active traders. Implementing such 
constraints is important in studies using observational data (Chua, Roth, & Lemoine, 
2015). After applying this condition, the consideration set reduces to 126,120 
observations, comprised of 42,105 distinct trader pairs. We use this dataset for 
estimation. 
5.2 Panel data structure 
 The dataset consists of repeated observations of trader dyads over time. The panel 
structure can be created in many ways. For instance, we can set up a panel for every 
trader dyad observed over the data collection window. However, doing so may introduce 
error correlations between panels and hence, create simultaneity. For instance, consider 
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the following example: trader i who allocates to both trader j and trader k in week t. Thus, 
setting different for every trader dyad will result in the following structure:  
 {Learner i  Guru j}week t-k 
               Panel{i,j} {Learner i  Guru j}week t 
   {Learner i  Guru j}week t+k 
Thus, the values of the outcome variable in any subsequent panel {i,k}, which comprises 
of Learner I and another Guru k in the same week t will be dependent on the values of the 
outcome variable in panel {i,j} observed in the same week because Learner i allocates to 
different Gurus from the same fund. Thus, allocation to one Guru will simultenously 
constrain the Learner’s ability to allocate to other Gurus at the same time. In other words, 
there will be a dependency between the panels of any given Learner. 
To overcome this issue, we construct panels for each Learner i that includes all the Gurus 
she allocated funds to during the observation window and cluster the standard errors on i. 
Thus, the number of panels in the consideration set is equal to the number of distinct 
Learners. Thus, the dataset, which is retains its dyadic nature, is structured as follows. 
Note that the panel variable is Learner {i}.  
 {Learner i  Guru j}week t-k 
  {Learner i  Guru j}week t 
                                 Panel{i}    {Learner i  Guru j}week t+k 
{Learner i  Guru k}week t 
   {Learner i  Guru k}week t+k 
 Because all the observations of Learner i are captured within a single panel, we 
reasonably overcome the issue of dependency between panels. As explained later, for 
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estimation, we incorporate dummies for Gurus and for Observation weeks to account for 
any unobserved heterogeneity for these entities. Lastly, this approach allows us to 
estimate the effect of physical distance, which is time-invariant in a given dyad. This 
form of panel data structure is typical in dyadic studies involving distance-based 
arguments (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2014). 
 For the hypothesis testing, we use a linear estimator devised particularly for large 
datasets requiring multi-way fixed effects specification (Correia, 2016; Torres et al., 
2013). The principal advantage of this estimator is its computational efficiency, which is 
essential when the estimation involves large vectors of dummies. The estimation 
incorporates three fixed effects. First, we control for any unobserved, time-invariant 
heterogeneity across the Learners. We compute heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, 
clustered on Learners. Next, we also incorporate dummy vectors for the Guru as well as 
the observation week. Thus, our estimates are robust to the potentially confounding, time-
invariant trader attributes such as gender, which has a bearing on investment behavior 
(Sundén & Surette, 1998) as well as to any exogenous time shocks. 
5.3 Variable descriptions 
Outcome variable: the study’s outcome variable is the percentage of funds 
allocated by a Learner to a Guru in a given week (ALLOC). In the dataset, we observe a 
considerable variation across the allocation percentages, ranging from 0 to 100. In 
approximately 43.9% of the observations, we find that a Learner does not allocate any 
funds to the Guru while in roughly 8.3% of observations, a Learner allocated 100% of her 
funds to the Guru. In the remaining observations (47.7%), the allocation percentage is 
between  0 and 100. 
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Independent variables: To construct the measures for Learner’s prior payoffs from 
a Guru (PRIOR_PAYOFFS), we draw on the transaction-level information provided by 
the platform. Specifically, we cumulate the gain across all the transactions, which were 
posted to Learner i’s portfolio in week t but were initiated by Guru j. The collective gain 
of such transactions represents the benefit that Learner i realized by choosing Guru j in 
week t. Wherever the collective gain from Guru j to Learner i was missing, we set it to 0, 
indicating that i generated no benefit from j in that week. For the estimation, we 
incorporate a 1-week lag to avoid simultaneity between the outcome variable and the 
Learner’s prior payoffs from allocations to that Guru. Our measure of prior payoffs is 
consistent with those used in the literature. For instance, Borah & Tellis (2014) measure 
prior payoffs of similar, past actions (p. 123).  
The study’s second explanatory measure pertains to the herding signal 
(COPIER_COUNT). We calculate this variable as follows: for each Guru j, we calculate 
the total number of Learners in week t. From this count, we subtract 1 to ensure that the 
focal Learner i is not counted. The resulting count of Learners is used as a herding signal. 
For instance, consider Learners i1 and i2 who copy-traded Guru j in week t. Thus, for the 
dyad {i1  j}, the value of Guru j’s herding signal is 1. Such count-based measures are 
typical in measuring the herding effect (Duan, Gu, & Whinston, 2009; Sun, 2013). 
The study’s final explanatory variable is the physical distance. We adopt Mayer & 
Zignago’s (2011) geodesic distance computed using the Great Circle formula. The 
measure calculates the distance between the two most populous cities of a given country 
pair  (Mayer & Zignago, 2011; p. 10). In our sample, we observe that the traders are 
spread across 95 unique countries. Thus, the dataset captures a globally dispersed sample 
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of users, underscoring the pertinence of physical distance as a factor. Our choice of 
measure for physical distance is consistent with the recent studies of distance effects in 
online contexts (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2014). 
 Control Variables: We incorporate several control variables to tease out the 
hypothesized effects. To account for any unobserved, time-invariant confounders, we 
incorporate fixed effects for Learners and Gurus. Next, to capture unobserved, temporal 
shocks, we incorporate a vector of dummies for the 46 observation weeks. Further, we 
also include a number of time-varying, Learner-specific controls.  
 First, we control for the Learner’s as well as Guru’s tenures on the platform, 
which we calculate as the count of days between the date on which the trader joined the 
platform and the first date of the given observation week. Note that Guru and Learner 
may have joined the platform before the data collection and hence, the 46-week 
observation window does not constrain calculation of tenure. Second, we control for the 
number of Gurus a given Learner copy-traded in the prior week 
(PRIOR_GURU_COUNT). Because the total fund amount limits the Learner, we expect 
the allocation to a specific Guru to be lower if the Learner is copy-trading with multiple 
Gurus. We also include the count of weeks in which the Learner profited through self-
trading (SELF_TRADE_BENEFITS). Collectively, such instances are likely to nudge a 
Learner to trade independently and therefore, have lower allocation.  
 Lastly, we control for the possible audience effect that could influence the 
Learner’s copy-trading behavior. On XTrader, the trading activities and portfolios of the 
traders are publicly visible. Given this information transparency, a Learner may be less 
inclined to portray herself as relying on Guru’s investment signals (Lee, 2002), especially 
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when other traders are observing her behavior. Therefore, the inhibiting effect of 
“watching eyes” may lower the Learner’s allocation. This effect alludes to recent studies 
of behavior in online platforms (Huang, Hong, & Burtch, 2016). We control for the 
potential effect of “watching eyes” by incorporating the number of distinct traders who 
have communicated with a focal Learner (MESSAGE_SENDERS). For estimation, we 
log-transform the control variables. Table 3.1 summarizes the key variables and lists the 
data sources.  
Table 3.1: Variable Description and Data Source 
Measure 
[Role in the model] 
Description Source 
ALLOC 
[Outcome] 
The percent allocation from 
Learner to Guru in week t 
The platform 
LEARER_TENURE 
[Control] 
The days between the date on 
which the Learner joined the 
platforms and the first date of 
the given week 
The platform 
PRIOR_GURU_COUNT 
[Control] 
The count of Gurus, which a 
Learner copied in a week  
The platform 
SELF_TRADE_BENEFITS 
[Control] 
The cumulative count of 
Learner’s profitable weeks 
through self-trading during the 
observation window 
The platform 
MESSAGE_SENDERS 
[Control] 
The cumulative count of 
distinct traders who sent 
messages to the Learner 
The platform 
GURU_TENURE 
[Control] 
The days between the date on 
which the Guru joined the 
platforms and the first date of 
the given week 
The platform 
PRIOR_PAYOFFS 
[Explanatory] 
The aggregate gain for Learner i 
through copied transactions 
from Guru j in week t-1 
The platform 
COPIER_COUNT 
[Explanatory] 
Count of Learners copying a 
given Guru in a given week t-1 
The platform 
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PHYSICAL_DISTANCE 
[Explanatory] 
The physical distance (in KMs.) 
between the two largest cities in 
Learner’s and Guru’s respective 
home countries 
CEPII 
We use “distcap” 
variable from 
dist_cepii.dta 
5.4 Estimation strategy 
To test the hypotheses, we employ the following model specification:         
 Yijt = β0+ β1 Gains from Guru+β2 Count of other Learners +  
          β3 Physical Distance +β4(Physical Distance×Gain from Guru)+ 
            β5(Physical Distance×Count of other Learners)+ 
           μit+σjt +ϕi+δj+λt+εijt    (Equation 1) 
The left-hand side of equation 1 is the allocation from Learner i to Guru j in the 
observation week t. The right-hand side depicts the linear combination of explanatory as 
well as the control variables. In addition to the coefficients of interest (β1-5), we also 
incorporate time-varying controls for the Learner (μit) and the Guru (σjt), Learner fixed 
effects (ϕi), Guru fixed effects (δj), and the observation week fixed effects (λt) As per H1 
and H2, the coefficient β1 and β2 should be significant and positive. According to H3, β3 
should be significant and negative. Next, we have developed competing hypotheses, 
indicating that while both β4 and β5 should be significant, each coefficient can attain 
either positive or negative sign. Finally, we include an error term, εijt. Some scholars 
recommended using the fractional response estimator for percentage-based outcomes 
because it is difficult to ensure the bounded nature of the outcome variable (Papke & 
Wooldridge, 2008). However, non-linear estimators often suffer from the incidental 
parameter problem (IPP) when the estimation involves multi-way fixed effects. 
Therefore, we use a linear estimator with multi-way fixed effects (Correia, 2016). To 
address the concern about out-of-bounds predictions, we report the proportion of the 
projected values of the outcome variable, (ALLOC), which fall outside the [0,1] interval. 
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In less than 1% of the observations, we find such values. Therefore, we conclude that our 
choice of estimator is reasonably justified. 
6. ANALYSIS 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and collinearity diagnostics  
Before undertaking the formal estimation, we check the dataset for indicators of 
possible multicollinearity. We begin by reporting the pairwise correlations between the 
variables (Table 3.2) followed by the descriptive statistics (Table 3.3). We find that all 
the correlation coefficients, while significant, are less than 0.5. Also, the highest variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is 1.29, which is well below the expected threshold (Rai et al., 
2015). Therefore, we conclude that the variables exhibit no major collinearity concerns. 
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Table 3.2: Pairwise Correlations and Collinearity Diagnostics 
 Allocation Learner 
Exp 
(Log) 
Guru 
Exp 
(Log) 
Learner’s 
Count of 
Gurus 
(Log) 
Count of 
Profitable 
Week 
(Log) 
Count of 
Message 
Senders 
(Log) 
Count 
of 
Copiers 
Gain in 
Pair 
Geographic 
Distance 
Allocation 1 
        
Learner Exp 
(Log) 
-0.0695* 1 
       
Guru Exp 
(Log) 
0.1005* 0.1948* 1 
      
Learner’s 
Count of 
Gurus (Log) 
-0.1264* 0.0415* 0.0124* 1 
     
Count of 
Profitable 
Week (Log) 
-0.1603* 0.1647* -0.0348* -0.0703* 1 
    
Count of 
Message 
Senders 
(Log) 
-0.1751* 0.2135* -0.0845* -0.0353* 0.3981* 1 
   
Count of 
Copiers 
0.1388* 0.0865* 0.4282* 0.0108* -0.0319* -0.0833* 1 
  
Gain in Pair 0.1001* -0.0185* -0.0139* -0.0044 -0.0135* -0.0141* -0.0007 1 
 
Geographic 
Distance 
0.0024 -0.0248* -0.0063* -0.0026 -0.0213* -0.0211* -0.0557* 0.0078* 1 
                        * p < 0.05 
                Max VIF = 1.29 
  Average VIF = 1.14 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Allocation Learner 
Exp 
(Log) 
Guru 
Exp 
(Log) 
Learner’s 
Count of 
Gurus 
(Log) 
Count of 
Profitable 
Week 
(Log) 
Count of 
Message 
Senders 
(Log) 
Count of 
Copiers 
Gain in 
Pair 
Geographic 
Distance 
(Normalized) 
Mean 19.82658 6.18069 6.514077 1.167455 0.336896 0.68878 443.5731 6.401245 -0.10797 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6902.26 -1.06843 
Maximum 100 7.723562 7.659643 3.044523 2.772589 8.540323 2119 2594.9 3.271918 
Standard 
Deviation 
29.88819 0.617133 0.60571 0.8389883 0.5344 1.209697 578.861 89.64584 1.00282 
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6.2 Main analysis 
We begin by estimating the influence of the Learner-specific, time-varying 
control variables on the allocation percentages (Model 1). The control variables operate 
in the expected fashion. For instance, SELF_TRADE_BENEFITS up to the prior week 
translate into lower allocation in the current week towards a specific Guru, suggesting 
that the Learners who obtained gains through self-trades allocate a smaller portion of 
their funds. Similarly, the GURU_COUNT in the prior week corresponds with a lower 
percentage allocation in the current week in a dyad; that is, the higher the number of 
Gurus a Learner copy-traded with, the more sparsely is her fund distributed. 
Next, in Model 2, we introduce the HERDING_SIGNAL as the first explanatory 
variable. In Model 3, we include PRIOR_PAYOFFS from the preceding week. Once 
again, we obtain a significant and positive coefficient, which is consistent with the 
argument in H2. In Model 4, we estimate the last main effect by including the 
DISTANCE measure. In Model 5, we find that the effects postulated in H1-H3 are 
collectively significant. Coming to the effect sizes, we find that a unit increase in the 
HERDING_SIGNAL results in 0.0198 units increase in allocation while a similar 
increase in PRIOR_PAYOFFS increases the allocation by 0.0192. On the other hand, a 
unit increase in PHYSICAL_DISTANCE is associated with a reduction in allocation by 
0.54 units.  
Moving on to estimating the interaction effects, we find that the interaction 
between HERDING_SIGNAL and PHYSICAL_DISTANCE is positive (Model 6). Thus, 
H4 is supported. In Figure 3.2, we observe that higher HERDING_SIGNAL marginally 
mitigates the negative influence of PHYSICAL_DISTANCE. Next, in Model 7, we 
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estimate the interaction between PRIOR_PAYOFFS and PHYSICAL_DISTANCE, 
finding support for H5a. Figure 3.3 reveals that PHYSICAL_DISTANCE attenuates the 
positive effect of PRIOR_PAYOFFS. In the fully specified Model 8, we find that the 
estimates are jointly significant. Thus, we conclude that the hypotheses H1-H5a are 
supported (Table 3.4). Lastly, to test whether the effects are stable to the inclusion of 
cultural distance, which are known to affect investment behavior (Beckmann, Menkhoff, 
& Suto, 2008), we re-estimate Model 8 by including Hofstede’s dimensions of culture: 
power distance, masculinity, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance 
(https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/). Including the absolute 
difference between these scores for countries of traders in a given dyad, we find 
coefficients similar to those obtained in Model 8. 
Figure 3.3 also indicates an interesting pattern. For Gurus who generated very low 
prior payoffs, physical distance seems to mitigate the negative effect on allocation. In 
other words, a Learner has a higher preference for a low-performing yet distant source 
over a comparably low-performing but proximal source. A possible explanation is that 
for a Learner, evaluating a distant source’s investment strategies based on prior payoffs 
may be relatively more obscure than those of a proximal source. This effect further 
underscores the behavioral nature of the physical distance effect. 
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Figure 3.2: Interaction between PHYSICAL_DISTANCE and HERDING_SIGNAL  
 
Figure 3.3: Interaction between PHYSICAL_DISTANCE and PRIOR_PAYOFFS  
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Table 3.4: Main Analysis with REGHDFE  
(DV = Allocation in a Trader Dyad) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Learner Exp (Log) 0.256 0.738 0.267 0.272 0.769 0.731 0.780 0.742 
 (0.977) (0.976) (0.969) (0.977) (0.968) (0.968) (0.968) (0.968) 
Guru Exp (Log) 35.35*** 6.854*** 34.42*** 35.34*** 5.591*** 5.643*** 5.554*** 5.606*** 
 (1.430) (1.445) (1.405) (1.430) (1.429) (1.431) (1.429) (1.431) 
Learner’s Count of Gurus (Log) 0.0895 0.0375 0.0640 0.0901 0.0114 0.0125 0.00959 0.0107 
 (0.0866) (0.0857) (0.0867) (0.0866) (0.0860) (0.0860) (0.0860) (0.0860) 
Count of Profitable Week (Log) -1.124** -1.485*** -1.009** -1.124** -1.372*** -1.378*** -1.366*** -1.373*** 
 (0.343) (0.341) (0.340) (0.343) (0.339) (0.339) (0.339) (0.339) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -1.987*** -2.221*** -1.926*** -1.988*** -2.162*** -2.164*** -2.162*** -2.163*** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
Count of Copiers  0.0196***   0.0198*** 0.0200*** 0.0198*** 0.0200*** 
  (0.00065)   (0.00064) (0.00065) (0.00064) (0.00065) 
Gain in Pair   0.0188***  0.0192*** 0.0193*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 
   (0.00117)  (0.00118) (0.00118) (0.00116) (0.00116) 
Geographic Distance    -0.543* -0.546* -0.952*** -0.538* -0.942*** 
    (0.231) (0.229) (0.246) (0.229) (0.246) 
Count of Copiers×Geographic 
Distance 
     0.000821***  0.000818*** 
      (0.00024)  (0.00024) 
Gain in Pair×Geographic 
Distance 
      -0.00212* -0.00208* 
       (0.00102) (0.00103) 
N 95227 95227 95227 95227 95227 95227 95227 95227 
Adj. R2 0.0217 0.0385 0.0288 0.0218 0.0462 0.0467 0.0463 0.0468 
AIC 807132.3 805478.7 806437.9 807115.8 804720.4 804675.2 804711.3 804666.4 
BIC 807179.6 805535.5 806494.7 807172.6 804796.1 804760.3 804796.5 804761.1 
Learner Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Guru Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
                 Robust standard errors clustered on Learners are reported in parentheses  
           + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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6.3 Robustness check I: Are the results dependent on panels in which the 
allocation does not change during the observation window 
 Similar to the traditional OLS estimator with fixed effects, the linear estimator 
with multi-way fixed effects, which is used in the present study (Correia, 2016) retains a 
panel even if the outcome measure exhibits no variation during the entire observation 
window. However, such panels may be systematically different from the rest because the 
changes in the explanatory variables are not reflected in the outcome variable. As the 
next robustness check, we assess whether such panels are driving the results. We begin 
by calculating the standard deviation of the outcome measure for each Learner. Then, we 
exclude the panels of those Learners in which the standard deviation was zero, suggesting 
that for the given Learner, the outcome measure has not changed during the 46-week long 
window. In all, we find 20,754 such pairs, amounting to 44,978 observations. After 
excluding these panels, we obtain qualitatively similar results (Model 9). Therefore, we 
claim that estimates are robust to the presence of Learners in which the outcome variable 
does not change (Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5: Robustness Checks  
(DV = Allocation in a Trader Dyad) 
 Model 9 
Learner Exp (Log) 1.219 
 (1.316) 
Guru Exp (Log) 10.05*** 
 (1.927) 
Learner’s Count of Gurus (Log) -0.441*** 
 (0.116) 
Count of Profitable Week (Log) -1.352** 
 (0.479) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -2.279*** 
 (0.238) 
Count of Copiers 0.0211*** 
 (0.000797) 
Gain in Pair 0.0137*** 
 (0.00109) 
Geographic Distance -0.680* 
 (0.288) 
Count of Copiers×Geographic Distance 0.000646* 
 (0.000257) 
Gain in Pair×Geographic Distance -0.00332*** 
 (0.000860) 
N 63046 
Adj. R2 0.0587 
AIC 531570.1 
BIC 531660.7 
Learner Fixed Effects Y 
Guru Fixed Effects Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y 
Robust standard errors clustered on Learners are reported in parentheses  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
6.4 Robustness check II: Are the results robust to the changes in the underlying 
observation set? 
 Next, we check whether changing the structure of the underlying dataset changes 
the results. This exercise assesses the stability of the results to smaller sample sizes (Lin, 
Lucas, & Shmueli, 2013; Yao, Dresner, & Palmer, 2009). Accordingly, we extract 
random subsamples, by excluding 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% of the observations. 
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For each subsample, we obtain consistent estimates (Model 10-14), suggesting that 
results are robust to the sample size (Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6: Robustness Checks  
(DV = Allocation in a Trader Dyad) 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Learner Exp (Log) 1.227 1.580 0.0524 -0.391 0.937 
 (1.004) (1.036) (1.085) (1.165) (1.208) 
Guru Exp (Log) 5.859*** 5.659*** 5.658*** 6.439*** 6.767*** 
 (1.489) (1.533) (1.589) (1.700) (1.957) 
Learner’s Count of 
Gurus (Log) 
0.0181 0.0844 -0.0206 0.0452 0.0861 
 (0.0904) (0.0915) (0.100) (0.105) (0.114) 
Count of Profitable 
Week (Log) 
-1.282*** -1.369*** -1.432*** -1.079* -0.384 
 (0.353) (0.371) (0.399) (0.423) (0.459) 
Count of Message 
Senders (Log) 
-2.111*** -2.132*** -2.223*** -2.172*** -2.223*** 
 (0.173) (0.180) (0.193) (0.204) (0.214) 
Count of Copiers 0.0198*** 0.0198*** 0.0207*** 0.0197*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.000685) (0.000712) (0.000750) (0.000784) (0.000903) 
Gain in Pair 0.0199*** 0.0196*** 0.0189*** 0.0200*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.00121) (0.00136) (0.00140) (0.00157) (0.00178) 
Geographic Distance -0.973*** -0.979*** -0.728** -1.004*** -0.726* 
 (0.254) (0.248) (0.267) (0.283) (0.285) 
Count of 
Copiers×Geographic 
Distance 
0.000770** 0.000913*** 0.000747** 0.000911** 0.000653* 
 (0.000249) (0.000257) (0.000274) (0.000283) (0.000324) 
Gain in 
Pair×Geographic 
Distance 
-0.00230* -0.00232* -0.00262* -0.00310** -0.00298* 
 (0.00113) (0.00116) (0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00145) 
N 85290 75418 65358 55756 45622 
Adj. R2 0.0472 0.0474 0.0493 0.0482 0.0521 
AIC 719528.3 635055.7 548940.4 466961.8 380679.9 
BIC 719621.8 635148.0 549031.2 467051.0 380767.2 
Learner Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Guru Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observation Week 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
                          Robust standard errors clustered on Learners are reported in parentheses   
               + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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6.5 Robustness check III: Are Guru’s country-specific investments driving the 
allocation? 
 Finally, we test whether the effects are contingent on the Learner’s preference for 
country-specific investment instruments. For instance, on XTrader, traders could invest in 
different stock exchange indices such as DAX, which include 30 German corporations 
listed on Frankfurt stock exchange and FTSE 100, which includes 100 UK firms listed on 
London Stock Exchange. Thus, it is possible that the allocation to a Guru may be subject 
to her country-specific investments, indicated by the frequency of her trades in the 
various stock exchange indices. To assess this concern, we first obtain a weekly count of 
transactions of stock indices for each Guru. Next, we aggregate this count over the entire 
observation window. Finally, we exclude all the dyads that include Gurus who have 
invested more than once in the stock exchange indices during the entire observation 
window. We argue that excluding such dyads should lead to substantially different results 
if the Guru’s location-specific investments drive the allocation. However, as shown in 
Model 15, we obtain consistent results, indicating that Learner’s preference for a Guru is 
not subject to the latter’s country-specific investments (Table 3.7).  
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Table 3.7: Additional Robustness Checks  
(DV = Allocation in a trader dyad) 
 Model 15 
Learner Exp (Log) 0.742 
 (0.968) 
Guru Exp (Log) 5.606*** 
 (1.431) 
Learner’s Count of Gurus (Log) 0.0107 
 (0.0860) 
Count of Profitable Week (Log) -1.373*** 
 (0.339) 
Count of Message Senders (Log) -2.163*** 
 (0.171) 
Count of Copiers 0.0200*** 
 (0.000651) 
Gain in Pair 0.0192*** 
 (0.00116) 
Geographic Distance -0.942*** 
 (0.246) 
Count of Copiers×Geographic Distance 0.000818*** 
 (0.000243) 
Gain in Pair×Geographic Distance -0.00208* 
 (0.00103) 
N 95227 
Adj. R2 0.0468 
AIC 804666.4 
BIC 804761.1 
Learner Fixed Effects Y 
Guru Fixed Effects Y 
Observation Week Fixed Effects Y 
     Robust standard errors clustered on Learners are reported in parentheses   
              + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
7. CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of our study is to explain the heterogeneity in the focal 
user’s preferences for different information sources. To that end, our study provides 
several insights. Leveraging a highly granular and temporal data, we show that the focal 
user’s preference for an information source associates positively with the source’s 
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herding signal (Shi & Whinston, 2013) as well as by the prior payoffs obtained from that 
source (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). More importantly, however, we find that both these 
attributes are contingent on the physical distance between the information source and the 
focal member of the audience. In particular, the results indicate that as the physical 
distance between the two increases, the herding signal becomes more influential while 
prior payoffs are discounted. In this section, we discuss the implications of these findings 
for several streams of research. 
First, our study contributes to the existing literature on the effect of physical 
distance on behavior in online platforms. Recent studies have shown that physical 
distance remains an impediment to interpersonal exchanges even in the age of the internet 
(Hortacsu, Martinez-Jerez, & Douglas, 2009). However, the majority of the empirical 
investigation in this regard has focused on the direct effect of distance on the outcome 
while the limited evidence pertaining to the interaction between the physical distance and 
other attributes of the source remains inconclusive (Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 
2015). We contribute to this literature by showing that the physical distance not only 
directly influences the focal user’s preference for an information source but also gets 
factored into the assessment of other attributes of the information source. In sum, our 
study expands on the current understanding of how physical distance influences behavior 
in online platforms. 
 Specifically, our paper contributes to the literature on herding signal and physical 
distance in online platforms. Buiding on recent efforts (Forman et al., 2008l Agarwal et 
al., 2015), we show that the effect of herding signal is contingent on the physical 
distance. This finding is interesting because it calls into question the applicability of 
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known explanations for such effect. For instance, Agarwal et al. (2015) argue that to the 
focal user, the herding signal about a physically proximate information source matters 
less because an observer may have prior connections with the proximal source (p. 271) 
enabling them to make their own determination of the quality of the artist’s work. This is 
not the case with artists who are distant  Thus, Agarwal et al. (2015) explain the 
interaction between herding signal and physical distance using the prior social ties 
between the proximal source and observer. However, we find that in settings, in which 
the presence of pre-existing social ties is unlikely, the herding signal about a physically 
proximate information source continues to matter less than that of the physically distant 
source. Thus, our finding shows that pre-existing social ties may not fully explain the 
interaction between the physical distance and herding signal, presenting an opportunity 
for future research to uncover other underlying theoretical mechanisms. 
Next, our study also advances the understanding of how prior payoffs influence 
future actions. Extant literature suggests that prior payoffs may “reinforce choices” and 
hence, significantly influence future actions (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008). Consistent with 
this argument, we show that the prior payoffs from an information source have a positive 
effect on the focal user’s subsequent preference towards that source. However, the 
physical distance between a focal user and the information source mitigates the effect of 
prior payoffs. This finding speaks directly to the competing explanations for the distance 
effect in online financial platforms (Lin & Viswanathan 2015). On the one hand, the 
economic explanation suggests that an individual prefers proximal investments because 
they provide better returns. On the other hand, the behavioral explanation indicates that 
factors such familiarity, emotional attachment, and identity come into play. The 
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attenuating effect of physical distance on prior payoffs indicates that a behavioral 
explanation is driving the physical distance effect.  
Finally, our study advances the literature on user behavior in the emerging 
“Fintech” phenomenon. In particular, we focus on social trading platforms (Doering, 
Neumann, & Paul, 2015). Although these platforms are nascent, with early entrants 
emerging in the first decade of the 21st century, they are already attracting the attention of 
network scholars, with an emphasis on copy trading (Wohlgemuth, Berger, & Wenzel, 
2016; Pentland, 2013). In this regard, our study models the Learner’s preference for a 
specific Guru’s investment signals. Thus, our study is an apparent extension of recent 
exploratory efforts to study investment behavior in social trading (Glaser & Risius, 
2017). Also, by showing theoretically consistent effects, which relate to multiple streams 
of extant literature, our study provides several conceptual anchors for future social 
trading researchers to examine the phenomenon from a behavioral standpoint. For 
instance, future work can assess whether these effects are transferable to different types 
of social trading platforms, and more generally, Fintech platforms.  
Our study’s findings must be viewed in light of certain limitations. We do not 
account for any cross-platform dynamics. It is possible that the same trader may be 
present on multiple social trading platforms and therefore, her behavior on XTrader may 
also be subject to her activity on the other platforms. We call for future research, 
incorporating cross-platform effects. Also, future work can also replicate our findings at 
different time intervals. Given the financial nature of the phenomenon, the user activity 
on most Fintech platforms is also driven by exogenous changes. While our study 
accounts for such changes by incorporating time-dummies, future work can replicate our 
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study across different time windows to assess the temporal generalizability of our 
findings. 
In closing, our study argues that while the literature on online platforms 
establishes the link between the ambient social information and users’ behavior, little is 
understood about the heterogeneity in the focal user’s preference for different sources of 
such information. Addressing this gap, we empirically and theoretically demonstrate the 
interplay between several underlying mechanisms. Going forward, we call for additional 
research examining determinants of information source preferences in online platforms, 
particularly in contexts in which such preferences may be costly. 
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CONCLUSION 
 While online platforms have made headways in several domains of human 
activity, none is perhaps of greater economic significance than the financial and 
investment markets (Lee & Shin, 2018). Such platforms are becoming increasingly 
mainstream as the millennials engage in financial investments (Morris, 2016). They are 
also interesting because they allow the participants to conduct a personal activity in a 
transparent and public fashion. This shift poses several interesting questions from a 
behavioral standpoint. Thus, it is hardly surprising that scholars have called for research 
specifically involving the online financial and investment platforms (Gomber, Kauffman, 
& Weber, 2015; Hendershott et al., 2017). In this stream, one of the important questions 
is whether and how a user’s investment behavior becomes susceptible to others’ actions 
and decisions especially in online platforms, which constantly expose users to 
information about “what others do”(Aral & Walker, 2011). The present dissertation 
addresses this question through a set of related empirical inquiries. 
 The dissertation makes several important contributions. First, using a highly 
granular dataset of person-level investments observed longitudinally, we are able to 
empirically tease out the underlying theoretical mechanisms that are mostly latent in 
traditional settings. In chapter 2, we show that in the presence of an audience, an 
individual becomes less susceptible to others’ actions. Moreover, this effect is robust to 
exogenous changes in uncertainty. Assessing the “audience effect” as a driver of 
investment behavior is problematic in traditional contexts such as investment and 
securities firms (Gurun, Stoffman, & Yonker, 2018). Although the investment activity in 
these contexts may have a significant digital component, it is still personal in nature as 
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the investment signals are rarely broadcast. Therefore, it is difficult to argue about as well 
as measure the audience of an investor in such settings. The behavioral implication of 
audience also speaks to the larger issue of increasing transparency of actions in digital 
space. We build on the ongoing effort to examine how “being visible online” changes the 
way individuals behave (Huang, Hong, & Burtch, 2016; Bapna et al., 2016). 
 Second, using the nuances of the empirical context, we can unambiguously 
observe the extent to which an individual is susceptible to others’ actions. In the studies 
reviewed in chapter 1, we observe that the typically used behavioral outcomes include 
aggregated online purchases (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006), monetary donations (Burtch, 
Ghose, & Wattal, 2013), and adoption of digital goods and services (Aral & Walker, 
2011; Bapna & Umyarov, 2015). However, these measures do not allow the researcher to 
attribute a focal user’s behavior directly to others’ actions. As a result, the researchers are 
limited in their ability to explain the focal user’s susceptibility to information about 
others’ actions. The novel outcome variables used in the two studies overcome this 
limitation. Thus, the present dissertation is an initial foray in isolating and explaining 
economic behavior in a highly social, transparent setting.  
 Lastly, we resolve several theoretical tensions that have, in recent years, emerged 
as the economic activities are shifting to online settings. For example, in chapter 2, we 
show that while a user who has independently attained success in the past is less 
susceptible to others in the present, the exogenous changes in uncertainty weaken this 
effect. Similarly, in chapter 3, we highlight the tension between prior payoffs that an 
information observer obtains from an information source and the physical distance 
between them. While higher payoffs in the past should increase the observer’s preference 
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for the source, physical distance should diminish it. We find that in the presence of these 
contrasting effects, the prior payoffs are significantly discounted. In the same vein, we 
show that the positive effect of herding signal about an information source attenuates the 
inhibiting effect of physical distance (Agarwal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015; Greenwood 
& Gopal, 2017). In the closing section of each chapter, we have already discussed the 
research and practical implications of these findings in greater detail. 
 The dissertation opens up several directions for subsequent research. While we 
have described some of these in Chapters 2 and 3, we now suggest a broader research 
agenda pertaining to investment behavior in online platforms. First, future research can 
adopt a social network lens to understand online investment behavior. Given the 
availability of rich datasets on person-level economic activities, one can examine how 
interpersonal networks emerge and evolve in such settings. Some of the interesting 
research issues in this direction include the topology of interpersonal networks (Chen, 
Chen, & Xiao, 2013), and creation and persistence of ties (Dahlander & McFarland, 
2013). Moreover, in at least some of the online investment and financial platforms, each 
tie that an investor forges is accompanied by a financial transaction. These platforms 
represent an important deviation in online networking space because, in more prevalent 
social networking platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn, an individual incurs little 
financial cost in forming and maintaining network ties. Thus, scholars can also compare 
the individuals’ decisions to form and maintain networks between the “costly” and 
relatively “costless” platforms to ascertain how social networking behavior changes when 
economic implications are introduced. Lastly, studies can examine the effects of 
prominent, offline events on individual behavior in digital space. We believe that given 
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the direct linkage between investment activity and real-world events, online investment 
and financial platforms can act as a powerful setting to study the impact of offline 
incidences on online behavior. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Social information capturing the trader’s investment activity  
 
 As an illustration, we show a trader profile page from a prominent social trading 
platform named ZuluTrade. The platform’s design features are similar to XTrader. The 
profile is publicly visible at https://www.zulutrade.com/trader/318058/trading?t=30 and 
was accessed on 22nd October 2017. Note that the platform shows a host of actions a 
trader undertook, resulting in a trove of ambient social information. In the right top 
corner, we see a button named as “Follow.” Any trader can click on this button to rely on 
this particular trader’s actions. On other platforms, including XTrader, the profile pages 
of the traders are shown similarly. 
 Social trading platforms also provide an aggregate view of the ambient social 
information. In the example given below, we see that the actions of several traders are 
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visible simultaneously along with the “Follow” button. This dashboard is publicly 
available on https://www.zulutrade.com/traders and was accessed on 22nd October 2017. 
The two images indicate that ambient social information, comprising the trading activities 
of other traders, as well as the feature for copy trading, are readily visible to the users on 
social trading platforms. Collectively, these features enable users to rely on ambient 
social information.  
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Appendix II: How a focal user (Learner) can search for an information source 
(Guru)? 
Social trading platforms, including XTrader, provide several ways for the Learner to find 
other traders for copy-trading. The illustration below shows an aggregation of active 
traders on a leading social trading platform called ZuluTrade 
(https://www.zulutrade.com/traders) 
 
In addition, platforms provide country-based trader search, which underscores the 
importance of physical distance. An illustration below shows the country-based trader 
search for ZuluTrade (Figure A: 
http://v4.zulutrade.com/PerformanceProvidersByCountry.aspx) and eToro (Figure B: 
https://www.etoro.com/discover/people) 
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Figure A 
 
Figure B 
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Appendix III: Comparing the social trading platforms 
 The hypothesized relationships in our study depend on the availability of the 
relevant information to the traders. For instance, in a trader dyad, estimating the effect of 
expertise signal on allocation is reasonable if the traders have access to such information. 
Moreover, to assess generalizability, it is also essential to demonstrate that the 
availability of such information cues transcends the platform used as the empirical 
context. In this appendix, we compare the available information across several leading 
social trading platforms: eToro (https://www.etoro.com/), ZuluTrade 
(https://www.zulutrade.com/), Tradeo (https://tradeo.com/), and Ayondo 
(https://www.ayondo.com/). We find that the availability of the crucial information is 
reasonably consistent across the platforms. 
Information on given trader’s profile 
page 
eToro ZuluTrade Tradeo Ayondo 
Number of copying traders 
(Visible prominently on each trader’s 
profile) 
    
Prior payoffs from the particular 
information source 
(Accessible through each trader’s 
portfolio) 
    
Home country 
(Shown typically close to the trader’s 
username) 
    
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Appendix IV: Summary of Fintech Studies  
(These studies examine the effect of information about others’ actions on the observer’s behavior) 
Paper Empirical Context Mapping  with 
Classification  
Framework  
(Chapter 1) 
Thies, Wessel & Benlian (2016) IndieGogo.com, Facebook Presentation 
Bi, Liu & Usman (2017) Zhongchou.com[A Chinese Crowdfunding website] 
Campbell & Cecez-Kecmanovic (2011) HotCopper (Internet Discussion Forum) Content 
Hashim, Kannan & Maximiano (2011) Lab experiment  
Burtch, Ghose & Wattal (2013) A crowdfunding platform for Online Journalism 
Døskeland & Pedersen (2016) A Norwegian online bank 
Thies, Wessel & Benlian (2016)* IndieGogo.com, Facebook 
Wessel, Thies & Benlian (2016) Kickstarter.com, Facebook.com 
Wohlgemuth, Berger & Wenzel (2016)  EToro [A social trading platform] 
Bi, Liu & Usman (2017)* Zhongchou.com[A Chinese Crowdfunding website] 
Feller, Gleasure & Treacy (2017)  LendingClub [A P2P lending platform] 
Roma, Petruzzelli & Perrone (2017) Technology projects on Kickstarter 
Lee & Andrade (2011) Lab experiment Observer and Source 
Burtch, Ghose & Wattal (2016) A large Crowdfunding platform 
Lukkarinen, et al. (2016) Invesdor.com [A Crowdfunding platform] 
Bapna, et al. (2017) Customized FB Application for Monetary Transfer 
Kang, Jiang & Tan (2017) Demohour.com [A Chinese Crowdfunding 
platform) 
Weibo.com 
 * Mapped on to multiple dimensions 
